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ABSTRACT 
Military contacts between the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
have presented opportunities for leaders in both countries’ defense community to share 
information and promote transparency.  Unfortunately, domestic and international factors 
have blunted cooperation in the past two decades.  Many are quick to argue that the 
political turmoil caused by internationally significant events such as the Tiananmen 
Square Crisis, the Taiwan Strait Crises, the Chinese Embassy bombing, and the EP-3 
Incident disrupted defense-related exchanges and cooperation.  Further examination of 
U.S. military relations policy displaces these casual observations in favor of explanations 
based on more complex domestic political agendas and bureaucratic politics in the DoD 
that led to more enduring changes in policy and implementation.  This examination 
found: the CDRUSPACOM was the most engaged and consistent advocate of increased 
military-to-military relations across a broad spectrum of contacts regardless of the 
temperament in Washington, D.C.; while internationally significant events impacted 
military relations for a short period, the more enduring shifts in military-to-military 
policy were driven by domestic politics and defense leadership changes; and despite 
claims of “gaining momentum” by many of the actors in both nations, military-to-
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A. PURPOSE, IMPORTANCE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Military contacts between the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) have presented unique opportunities for leaders in both countries’ defense 
community to share information and promote increased transparency.  Unfortunately, a 
combination of domestic and international factors has blunted the extent to which these 
nations have cooperated in the past two decades.  Many are quick to argue that the 
political turmoil caused by internationally significant events such as the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square Crisis,1 the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crises,2 the 1999 bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade,3 and the 2001 EP-3 Incident4 disrupted defense-related exchanges 
and cooperation.  Further examination, however, may displace these casual observations 
in favor of explanations based on more complex domestic political agendas or 
bureaucratic politics in each country’s defense department that led to more enduring 
government policy changes. 
While both nations’ military relations policies have intentionally limited open and 
free relations, the impact of often unrelated international events and the domestic political 
agenda of policy makers in the United States have hurt military relations excessively over 
the last several decades.  Civilian and defense leaders in both the United States and the 
PRC have vacillated between advocacy of and opposition to continued exchange.   
Current debate in the United States revolves around the benefits and risks of 
continued military relations with China to United States’ national security.  Some leaders 
                                                 
1 In 1989, the CCP cracked down on student and worker protests calling for democratic reforms resulting in 
more than a dozen deaths and hundreds of injuries.  The international community responded with economic and 
trade sanctions. 
2 In 1995 and 1996, the PRC launched missiles into the Taiwan Straits in response to perceptions of 
increased moves by the island government towards an independent Taiwan. 
3 In 1999, NATO bombs hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and 
outraging Chinese public opinion. NATO claimed they were firing at Yugoslav positions. 
4 In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with an American EP-3 surveillance plane over international waters 
off the coast of mainland China.  The American aircraft was forced to complete an emergency landing into China 
while the Chinese fighter crashed, killing the pilot. 
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in the Defense Department are increasingly concerned that further exchanges place the 
United States’ national security at risk.  As recently highlighted by Congressional 
Research Service author Shirley Kan, 
…skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have 
debated whether the contacts have significant value for achieving U.S. 
objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the [People’s 
Liberation Army] PLA’s warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. 
security interests.5   
This thesis reviews historical and current trends as well as the practices and 
policies related to military contacts between these two nations to determine what drove 
the ebb and flow of Sino-American military relations.  More simply, it asks, what were 
the domestic forces that shaped United States policies relating to the extent of military 
cooperation and transparency?  And subsequently, how did bureaucratic politics and 
organizational processes within the Department of Defense (DoD) affect the United 
States military’s implementation of those policy changes?   
To properly understand the current state of military exchanges and cooperation 
one must first examine the history of military contacts and the major events influencing 
cooperation to evaluate the context in which those military relations policies were eased 
or restrained.  What is clear is that both nations have deliberately shaped military contact 
policies to hinder open and free exchange in order to prevent unnecessary risk associated 
with technology information transfer (United States’ perspective) and to prevent 
disclosure of current operational capabilities and the competency of the individual 
soldier, airmen or sailor (also the United States’ perspective but primarily the Chinese 
perspective).  But the greater issue resides with determining the causes for the expansion 
and retraction of military relations.  Were military relations policies driven by security 
concerns?  Was the retraction of military exchange policies a result of domestic politics 
having little to do with actual national security or defense concerns?  Or did the changes 
in cooperation and exchange reflect bureaucratic politics and organizational processes in 
the defense community that might advocate or resist cooperation?   
                                                 
5 Shirley Kan, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. – China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 24 January 2007), i. 
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With these questions in mind, evaluating past and current foreign relations 
policies as they relate to encouraging or hindering efforts to exchange military personnel 
between China and the United States is critical to understanding the future of military 
cooperation, transparency and confidence building.  Only then can constructive policy 
prescriptions be formulated.  This thesis will educate leaders in the political and military 
communities in the United States about the differences in perspectives between the PRC 
and the United States; encourage leaders to reform existing policy objectives that remain 
unrealistic given those varied perspectives and expectations; and recommend new forums 
of exchange and contact that meet the recommended objectives.  It is hoped that through 
greater understanding of each nation’s perspectives, revised objectives and new methods 
of contact, both nations can move into the twenty-first century as global partners, not 
military rivals. 
To complete this brief evaluation several considerations must be set aside.  First, 
American interests in the Asia-Pacific region are not be examined.  For the purposes of 
this thesis United States’ interests are assumed as valid and important.6  Second, given 
the American interests in the region and the rising influence of the PRC on regional 
stability, it is assumed that China plays a key role in effecting the ability of the United 
States to meet its regional goals and objectives.  As Denny Roy states,  
The world has room for both China and the United States to enjoy ample 
security and prosperity.  Yet they appear locked on a course heading 
toward an outcome most people in both nations would prefer to avoid, one 
that entails diversion of resources towards a wasteful mutual antagonism.7   
China’ growing influence requires the United States to either cooperate with the 
PRC in a shared-responsibility system or to compete with the PRC to restrain its 
influence in the region.  Without the threat of the Soviet Union as the common thread that 
                                                 
6 In-depth discussions about the United States’ interests in the Asia-Pacific since the Second World War can 
be found in Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 16th ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004); and Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2d ed. 
(New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 
7 Denny Roy, “Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable vs. Contingent Hazards,” in Paul J. Bolt, Damon 
V. Coletta and Collins G. Shackelford, Jr., American Defense Policy, 8th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 75. 
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bound these nations’ cooperative efforts for decades, domestic factors have played an 
increasing role in the shaping of Sino-American foreign relations policies.8   
It is now widely understood that in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
common strategic concerns, such as those that promoted US-China 
cooperation, no longer compel nations to accommodate each other’s 
interests and that absent any strategic imperative, domestic factors have 
become increasingly important factors in foreign policy-making.9 
The PRC and the United States will need to forge through this era of uncertainty to meet 
their mutual objectives of stability in the Asia-Pacific. 
B. CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS 
For China, foreign military relations play a key part in overall foreign relation 
policies and practices.  With the significant role of the PLA in China’s government and 
Party politics, the PLA was used as a political tool both domestically and internationally.  
As Allen and McVadon state, 
The PLA’s foreign relations program has several goals: To shape the 
international environment in support of key Chinese national security 
objectives; to improve political and military relations with foreign 
countries; to enhance China’s military and defense industry modernization; 
to provide military assistance to countries in the developing world; and to 
acquire knowledge in modern military doctrine, operations, training, 
military medicine, administration, and a host of non-combat related 
areas10 
Similar priorities and methods can be seen in official documents such as the 2004 
National Defense White Paper published by China’s State Council Information Office: 
To carry out military exchanges and cooperation.  In line with the national 
foreign policy, the PLA conducts military cooperation that is non-aligned, 
non-confrontational and not directed against any third party.  The PLA 
                                                 
8 Bates Gill, Meeting the Challenges and Opportunities of China’s Rise: Expanding and Improving 
Interaction between the American and Chinese Policy Communities (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2006); and 
Jing-Dong Yuan, “Sino-American Military Relations Since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress and Pitfalls,” 
Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, 33, no.1 (Spring 2003): 55, 64. 
9 Robert. S. Ross, Forward in After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and US-China Relations, ed., Robert S. 
Ross (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998), vii. 
10 Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations (Washington D.C.: The 
Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1999), iv. 
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takes part in the UN peacekeeping operations and international counter-
terrorism cooperation.  While promoting military exchanges in various 
forms, the PLA works to establish security dialogue mechanisms in order 
to create a military security environment featuring mutual trust and mutual 
benefit.  It takes part in bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises in 
non-traditional security fields so as to enhance the joint capabilities to 
cope with threats in those fields.  The PLA learns from and draws on the 
valuable experience of foreign armed forces, and introduces, on a selective 
basis, technologically advanced equipment and better management 
expertise from abroad to advance the modernization of the Chinese armed 
forces.11 
To meet these goals China has used a variety of methods such as high-level exchanges, 
functional exchanges, attaché offices, arms sales and arms control negotiations and 
participation in peacekeeping operations.12  While this thesis does not focus on the merits 
of these perspectives of the Chinese, per se, it is important to recognize that foreign 
military relations are intrinsically valued by the Chinese and thus can be used to maintain 
the overall level of the relationship. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
For decades scholars have struggled to develop adequate theories and models that 
explain the international aspects of state behavior in relation to domestic factors.  While 
the rational actor model assumes a unitary actor who makes autonomous decisions 
without significant consultation from other players in government, 13  the realities in 
today’s democracies are far different.  There have been several challenges to the rational 
actor model that placed increased emphasis on the multitude of players in agenda setting, 
policy formulation and implementation.  Specifically, the national foreign policy process 
has at least three phases that afford the greatest opportunity for the involvement of senior 
government officials to shape the agenda, alternatives, policies and implementation of a 
government’s foreign policy: agenda setting phase, alternative presentation/selection 
phase and implementation phase. 
                                                 
11 China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing, China: Information Office of China’s State Council, 27 
December 2004). http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html (accessed 12 October 2006). 
12 Allen and McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations, 19. 
13 Glenn R. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson, 2006), 247–8. 
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1. Agenda-setting Phase 
What are the origins of policy?  Or, as Kingdon asks, “What makes people in and 
around government attend…to some subjects and not others?”14  More simply, how do 
certain issues get to be issues in the first place?  Understanding the origins of issues and 
how those issues often turn into policy, legislation and practice is an important part of the 
examination of the foreign policies of nations.  The intra-national influences brought 
about by politics cannot be ignored as critical factors in policy formulation. 
As the reviews of Kingdon’s first edition conclude, Agendas, Alternatives and 
Public Policy’s use of empirical data to examine the agenda-setting phase in policy 
formulation and alternative selection provide invaluable evidence confirming the 
complexity of governmental politics.15  In short, Kingdon concluded that while members 
of Congress are important to the agenda-setting phase, it is the president and his political 
appointees that have the greatest influence on agenda setting.16   
It is therefore important to find the origins of issues; whether they begin in the 
legislative branch or executive branch; who champions an issue; and their motivations.  
Unfortunately (or fortunately as constitutionalists would argue), in a democratic system 
such as the United States, politics sometimes gets in the way of purely rational agenda 
setting, alternative selection and policy formulation.  A convergence of “problems, 
solutions and politics [does] not happen automatically in American politics.”17 
Based on Kingdon’s explanations of the agenda-setting phase, one should expect 
the president and his appointees to shape the agenda of Sino-American foreign and 
military relations.  If Kingdon’s conclusions hold true, the president and his political  
 
 
                                                 
14 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 1. 
15 Evelyn Brodkin, “Review: Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, 100, 
no. 1 (Spring 1985): 165–166; and Clifford J. Wirth, “Review: Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy,” The 
Ameri95 Political Science Review, 79, no. 1 (March 1985): 213–4. 
16 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 42–44. 
17 James A. Thurber, forward in Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2d ed., by John W. Kingdon 
(New York: Longman, 2003), viii. 
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appointees, such as the SECDEF, will have the most significant impact on the military 
relationship between the United States and the PRC during this phase and less of an 
effect thereafter.   
2. Alternative Presentation and Course of Action Selection Phase 
One of the most highly regarded explanations of the alternative development and 
selection phase in policy decisions in the latter part of the twenty-first century is Graham 
Allison’s work, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, first published 
in 1971 and since updated. 18   Widely accepted by the political science community, 
Allison’s original work has found its way into classrooms across the Western world for 
more than three decades.19  Based primarily on the Cuban Missile Crisis as his case study, 
Allison attempted to explain two main points: a) What are the internal forces/actors of 
government that shaped policy makers’ decisions during crises? and b) How did 
organizational behavior affect the outcomes of certain policy decisions made by senior 
government officials?   
In both editions of this work, Allison and Zelikow offer a “Model III: 
Governmental Politics,” which describes the influences of lower-level actors on the 
available alternatives presented to the decision maker and on course of action selection.  
Through “bargaining games,” influential leaders work towards the least common 
denominator recommendation.20  There is thus: 
…no unitary actor but rather many actors…who act in terms of no 
consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various 
conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals; players who 
make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the 
pulling and hauling that is politics.21 
                                                 
18 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Examining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little Brown 
& Co., 1971); and Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Examining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). 
19 David P. Houghton, “Essence of Excision: A Critique of the New Version of Essence of Decision,” 
Security Studies, 10, no. 1 (2000): 151. 
20 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Examining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 255.  
21 Ibid. 
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This model, more commonly termed the bureaucratic politics model, describes a set of 
players who share power and view the problem and potential solutions based on their 
varied position in government.  Or as some call it, “where you stand depends on where 
you sit.”  Each player approaches the problem from a different frame of reference and 
therefore offers alternatives that may differ greatly from those presented by other actors.  
The State Department, for example, might offer diplomatic means to resolve an 
international problem while one would expect the DoD to offer military means for the 
same problem.  Once alternatives are proposed and a course of action is selected, that 
decision is passed to the responsible organization for implementation.   
 In the cases that are examined in this thesis, therefore, I evaluate the influence of 
lower-level actors in the alternative presentation and selection phase of policy making.  In 
the case of Sino-American military relations, Allison’s explanations point to senior 
leaders in the DoD, such as Assistant Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Deputy 
Secretaries, as the primary actors in the alternative presentation and course of action 
selection process.  The top-level political actors should have less of a role in this phase. 
3. Implementation Phase 
Termed “Model II: Organizational Behavior,” this model attempted to explain 
military responsiveness to civil direction.  This model presented governmental behavior 
as follows: 
…less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations 
functioning according to standard patterns of behavior….Thus, 
government behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the 
independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by 
government leaders.  Government leaders can substantially disturb, but 
rarely precisely control, the specific behavior of these organizations.22   
Given the prominence of the DoD in the United States and its integration into 
major decision-making bodies such as the cabinet and National Security Council, one 
would be hard pressed to argue that it lacked the ability to avoid “precise control” by civil 
authorities.  In fact, under the leadership of more recent administrations one could argue 
                                                 
22 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Examining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 143. 
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the defense community has grown in importance, influence and credibility to the extent 
that today’s environment invites such behavior in the United States’ military more than 
ever before. 
The ability of the Department of Defense to “shirk” orders given by civilian 
leaders has grown significantly since the Cuban Missile Crisis.23  Even in the latter part 
of the twentieth and in the early years of the twenty-first century where many have 
argued that traditional military threats have declined significantly, especially since the 
end of the cold war, the American armed forces continue to gain public trust and 
confidence and a corresponding level of influence over civilian leader decision-making 
processes. 24   Keeping that growing influence in check and reducing the risk of 
autonomous action on the part of the U.S. military appears real and necessary.  As Feaver 
argues, “political control does not end with the delegation decision.”25 
Allison’s original work, however, was not without criticism.  As details involving 
the inner communications between the most senior administrators in the United States 
government slowly became available, and as previously disclosed information proved 
false, other scholars began to question the supporting evidence behind Allison’s 
explanations.26  In response to those critics and armed with new information surrounding 
the crisis, Allison teamed with Philip Zelikow to publish the second edition in 1999.  
While this work retracted some evidence previously proven false, several authors, such as 
Houghton in 2000 found it once again failed to adequately support the main arguments.27 
Despite these critiques and the book’s somewhat flawed use of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis as a supporting case, the underlying premises hold true.  In short, the authors argue 
that a combination of domestic forces, some of which have little to do with the greater 
                                                 
23 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003).  This work discusses the ability of military institutions to either shirk (avoid) 
civil direction or work (comply with civil authority). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 75. 
26 One such example is David A. Welch, “The Organization Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms,” 
International Security, 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992). 
27 Houghton, Essence of Excision: A Critique of the New Version of Essence of Decision. 
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international context, shaped policy maker decisions and the tangible outcomes that 
stemmed from those decisions.  Foreign policy therefore, often reflects the domestic 
agenda of several political actors or the bureaucratic apparatus with the greatest influence 
within the administration.  The outcomes that may be derived from those policies are 
often skewed by organizational processes that distort the intended outcomes into 
unintended results.  In the cases examined in this thesis, bureaucratic resistance and the 
complexity of civilian control are evident in the development and implementation of 
Sino-American military relations. 
D. SURVEY OF PRIOR WORK ON THE QUESTION 
Although many works adequately examine the United States’ policies, practices 
and laws concerning the exchange of military members with the PRC, few account for 
the origins of such policies, the domestic influences that shape those policies over time, 
and the defense department’s implementation of such policies.  A recent work by the 
Congressional Research Service analyzes military contacts between the United States and 
China from 1993 to 2006.  Yet this report focuses largely on congressional oversight and 
only summarizes contacts between high-level officials--usually flag officers or civilian 
appointees--in the defense community.  What is missing in this and other works is a 
detailed evaluation of the origin of domestic policies and how the military community 
embraced or shirked those policies.  Similarly, given the fact-based nature of these types 
of reports (outlining facts for consideration by Congress without providing causal 
explanations) it fails to adequately explain the changes in policy over time. 
The most relevant work comes from a book titled, After the Cold War: Domestic 
Factors and US-China Relations.28  In this edited book the authors examine changes in 
Sino-American foreign relations from the cold war through the immediate aftermath of 
the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989.  Consistent with the premises of my thesis, Ross 
acknowledges the changing international context that changed the basis for Sino-
American relations. 
                                                 
28 Robert S. Ross, ed., After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and US-China Relations (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 1998). 
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…in the aftermath of the Cold War, common strategic concerns, such as 
those that promoted US-China cooperation, no longer compel nations to 
accommodate each other’s interests and that absent any strategic 
imperative, domestic factors have become increasingly important factors 
in foreign policy-making.29 
The chapters in Ross’ edited volume evaluate the broader aspects of Sino-
American relations, including economic and trade ties from the end of the cold war 
through the mid-1990s.  This broad approach leaves room for further examination.  
Specifically, the more narrowly defined area of Sino-American military relations 
warrants further study, especially given the internationally significant events occurring 
since the publication of this book in 1998 such as the Chinese Embassy bombing and EP-
3 incident. 
1. Major Debates and Approaches to the Issue 
The dominant approach to this issue has been to examine the changes in policy as 
they correspond to significant international events such as Tiananmen, Taiwan Strait, 
Belgrade Bombing or the EP-3 incident.  This thesis, however, shows that the debate over 
benefits versus risk of military relations between these nations owes its origin more 
deeply in the internal politics of the United States than with these internationally 
significant events. 
2. Major Questions and Arguments 
The task therefore is not only to examine international events that have influenced 
exchange policies, but to take into account the domestic agendas that have driven changes 
in military cooperation.  As previously stated, much debate about the risks to national 
security posed by military cooperation has continued to present day.  Many, if not most, 
of these debates are entwined with political motivations often driven by emotions or 
political agendas unrelated to the actual effects of military contacts.   
Similarly, the DoD’s approach to implementing these policies can either be 
explained by the personal views and agendas of key leaders within the military or by 
                                                 
29 Ross, Forward in After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and US-China Relations. 
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directly related empirical perceptions that might explain the extent of associated risk.  
What is clear, however, is that military relations as a whole were not an end in and of 
themselves.  They were often a tool for larger political purposes used in many cases to 
express the administration’s displeasure with PRC policies or practices—thus a carrot 
and stick.  As a result, the benefits of a strong, strategic military-to-military relationship 
between the United States and the PRC are often missed. 
Given these theories and recent works concerning the formulation of foreign 
policy by the principals and the resultant implementation by their agents, several research 
questions may be posed:   
• Do leaders’ domestic political agendas influence the military relations policies 
of nations more than other more directly relevant forces? 
• Do changes in political party of the legislative majority, executive 
administration or senior military officers affect military relations policies 
without a corresponding change in the international environment? 
• Do bureaucratic politics within the DoD alter the implementation of military 
relations policies to the extent that they do not accurately reflect the intentions 
of the principals’ original policy? 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
To examine these questions I use the military relations policies of the United 
States and the PRC as a case study.  Since rapprochement in 1971, the Sino-American 
relationship has evolved greatly from periods of stern tension to periods of relative trust, 
cooperation and transparency.  Changes in the United States’ leadership and 
internationally significant events have been turning points in military relations between 
these nations.  This case therefore provides a great example of a variety of policy changes 
and a diverse implementation spectrum.  Specifically, I examine significant events of 
change such as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, changes in 
executive leadership beginning with the President George H. W. Bush and senior defense 
leadership changes as they overlapped internationally significant events in the latter part 
of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
This thesis uses a combination of case study, comparative study, content analysis 
and trend analysis to draw conclusions about previous and current contacts.  Sources 
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include primary policy documents, standard secondary published documents, laws, 
reports and interviews.  By using a combination of scholarly work, DoD documents, 
publications from relevant think tanks, news releases and legislation, I capture the 
necessary evidence to show the significance of domestic politics in policy formulation 
and the extent of bureaucratic politics in policy implementation. 
F. ROADMAP 
The first section of this work outlines the major actors involved in the formulation 
and implementation of foreign military relations policies.  It is important to understand 
the players involved in foreign military relations, what role each agent played in the 
process and in what stage of the process they participated.  Once the actors and processes 
are identified and introduced, I examine the internationally significant and domestic 
events that have impacted Sino-American military relations.  Case studies that examine 
the origins of the major legislative pieces related to Sino-American military relations, 
changes in presidential administrations and senior defense leadership will follow.  Lastly, 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 15
II. MAJOR ACTORS 
The formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy is a complicated and 
protracted process that involves the efforts of a wide range of governmental and non-
governmental organizations.  By design, the diffusion of responsibilities in the U.S. 
federal government requires the convergence of the executive and legislative branches in 
the policy-making process related to foreign military relations and often involves 
additional actors such as non-governmental entities like think tanks, the media and 
interest groups.  In the two major stages considered in this thesis, policy making and 
implementation, understanding the roles of the major actors is an important step in 
gaining a greater appreciation of the forces that influence foreign relations and military 
relations policies development and military responsiveness.   
It is important, however, first to clarify the two levels of policy that are related to 
this thesis: foreign relations and military relations.  The overall foreign policy level 
provides an umbrella of coverage for all other foreign relations sub-policies to follow 
(see Figure 1).  In the case of Sino-American relations, there was an “overall” position of 
the executive branch under which all other sub-policies fell.  Those sub-policy areas 
included not only military relations, but also trade relations, diplomatic relations, etc.  
This distinction between the United States’ overall foreign policy stance towards China 
and the specific military relations policies between the two nations is one that must be 
clearly understood given the overlapping roles of several actors in both levels of policy 
development.  To varying degrees, the president and Congress have had a role in not only 
setting the overall foreign relations policy towards the PRC but also in the specific area 
of foreign military relations policy.  For the purposes of this thesis, the overall foreign 
relations policy level will hereafter be termed “foreign relations” policy and the military 
sub-policy area will be termed military relations policy. 
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United States Foreign Policy Towards China 
Military Relations Trade Relations Diplomatic Relations 
Figure 1.   Relationship Between Levels of Foreign Policy 
 
A. POLICY MAKING 
American foreign relations policy development has several actors that stand out as 
primary contributors.  Within the executive branch it is obvious the president and his 
closest security advisors play a critical role in setting the agenda and in presenting a set of 
policy options to other actors that are involved in the decision-making process.  “When 
the administration considers a given issue a top-priority item, many other participants do, 
too.” 30   Through public statements, legislative proposals and executive orders the 
president and his staff shaped foreign relations policy directly.  American views on 
foreign relations policies are often articulated by the president and other civilian leaders 
in the administration.  These views in turn shape the agenda of the legislative branch 
which either embraced or opposed the executive’s comments.  The mere fact that the 
executive makes public statements concerning the foreign relations policies of the United 
States helps make these issues become issues within the legislature.  “When the president 
sends up a bill, it takes first place in the queue.  All other bills take second place.”31 
Once the legislative branch champions the issue, the task of shaping the issue into 
a formal piece of public policy falls in the hands of elected officials and congressional 
staffers.  In many cases, a Senator or Congressman sponsors a legislative proposal or 
presented an amendment for consideration by the most applicable committees.  In the 
case of military relations policies, equity rests in more than one committee…making the 
process even more complicated than issues with only one committee of interest.  Both the 
Foreign Relations (called International Relations in the House of Representatives) and 
                                                 
30 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 21. 
31 Ibid., 23. 
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Armed Services Committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives have roles in 
pushing legislation through Congress.  Whereas the executive branch plays a key role in 
setting the agenda, identifying and selecting alternatives is often more the role of 
Congress than the executive.32  Through painful tasks of garnering support for proposed 
alternatives, the political leverage of actors within the legislature become the 
predominant tool used to negotiate the difficult obstacles that hinder change. 
Lastly, one cannot ignore the influence of interest groups and think tanks in the 
shaping of agendas, options and policy decisions.  While these organizations play no 
official roles in agenda setting, alternative identification and policy decisions, their 
advocacy for or opposition to new or changing policies relating to the military relations 
of the United States and the PRC had an impact on civilian leader decisions.  While 
Kingdon finds that these groups played a lesser role than the governmental actors, their 
influence through lobbying and scholarly publication does have an impact on political 
officials who consider their evidence and arguments.33   
The formal results of policy development are found in public policy, law, 
executive orders and are carried down into military instructions and regulations.  One of 
the most recent examples of the complex process of taking an immature idea, developing 
alternatives, negotiating the selection of alternatives and finally, the codification of those 
decisions into public policy can best be seen in the four-year process of defense reform in 
the 1980s that culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.  The inner workings of 
domestic politics and their influence on defense policy can readily be seen in Locher’s 
Victory on the Potomac, 34  which captures the roles of policy makers and their 
interactions in what was considered the most significant defense reform since the Second 
World War.  
According to Locher, the initial proposals for change in the structure of the DoD 
came from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in his annual testimony 
                                                 
32 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 35.  
33 Ibid., 67.  
34 James R. Locher, III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004). 
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before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC).  Only a few staff members and 
Congressmen championed the issue through subsequent fact-finding efforts and hearing.  
The ensuing months, and eventually years, were a protracted interplay between the CJCS, 
Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and 
Congress.  The bureaucratic resistance from the defense community and interest groups, 
as well as the reluctance of key congressional leaders to allow the issue to surface out of 
subcommittee, nearly grounded the efforts of congressional and defense advocates to a 
halt.  This convoluted process provided ample opportunities for personal agendas, public 
opinion and political power to influence the outcomes and often resulted in only modest 
changes in policy, especially during the election years when defense policies were at the 
forefront of party agendas.  Although at a smaller scale, the difficulties seen in the 
completion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act can also be seen in the development of foreign 
military relations policies. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
Once policy decisions are reached the implementation of those decisions rested 
clearly on the shoulders of several actors.  Obviously, the DoD was the most central actor 
in this phase.  More specifically, several offices and individuals within the department 
played critical roles in ensuring policies were implemented in accordance with the 
decision makers’ intentions.  The SECDEF, Combatant Commanders (in this case, 
Commander, Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM)), and CJCS were directly involved in 
the implementation of foreign military relations policies. 
The SECDEF and his immediate staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) play not only a role in the policy making phase, but more importantly, play one of 
the most influential roles in the implementation phase.  Taking the direction provided by 
civil authorities and turning that guidance into executable practices was often a difficult 
task.  Legal interpretations not withstanding, the process of changing directives in the 
enormous bureaucracy that is the DoD takes months, even years. 
In recent years, the role of the SECDEF can arguably be considered more 
prominent than any time in history.  With Secretary Rumsfeld’s unique personality, frank 
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approach and clear support from the President, the SECDEF has had tremendous latitude 
to implement policy with great discretion.35  As my interviews with scholars in China 
confirmed, even the Chinese realize the significant influence the SECDEF has on not 
only shaping implementation but also in presenting outsiders clues about the DoD’s 
intentions.36   
The two remaining actors with significant influence on the implementation of 
foreign military relations policies are both uniformed officers of the United States Armed 
Forces: the CDRUSPACOM and CJCS.  Historically, the CDRUSPACOM has played a 
very proactive role in implementing the foreign military relations policies of the United 
States by establishing and maintaining stronger relations with nations falling within the 
geographic boundaries of the command.37  The current CDRUSPACOM has followed 
this proactive stance and may be the most integral actor in the implementation phase of 
foreign military relations as they relate to the Asia-Pacific.  Although to a lesser extent, 
the CJCS has also been an important implementation-phase player within the DoD.  As 
the principal military advisor to the president, the CJCS holds a very prominent and 
public role that can either foster or hinder foreign military relations. 
C. SUMMARY 
Given the nature and design of democracies, the inherent bargaining process often 
diluted the policy decisions so greatly that only minimal changes occurred over long 
periods of time.  Correspondingly, the results of such policy changes have been less-than-
                                                 
35 Remarks Following a Meeting With the Secretary of Defense and an Exchange With Reporters in 
Crawford, Texas, 21 August 2002, John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online], 
Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64241 (accessed 30 January 2007); and Terrance Hunt, “Bush Gives 
Rumsfeld Strong Show of Support,” Associated Press Online, 14 April 2006. http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu:8080/universe/document?_m =6994beb715193be3852bea7e287c49bf& 
_docnum=4&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkVb&_md5=eec98c94b f78d25413f9d9821f37ab2e (accessed 30 January 
2007).  These two examples highlight President Bush’s confidence in Secretary Rumsfeld’s abilities and the 
latitude offered him to meet National Security Objectives. 
36 Interview by author, 9 June 2006, Shanghai, China with Zhang Pei, Deputy Director, Department of 
Strategic Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies.  
37 U.S. Pacific Command covers more than 50% of the world’s surface and contains more than 60% of the 
world’s population in different 43 countries. 
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perfect and commonly slow in coming.38  However, in cases of extreme political rift and 
when conditions presented a disproportionate amount of influence by one of the major 
actors, significant shifts in policy development and implementation were possible. 
It is in these periods that one can find the greatest changes in Sino-American 
relations policies.  Specifically, transitions of the executive administration from 
Republican to Democratic and back to Republican, political fallout of the Chinese 
espionage investigations in the late 1990s and changes in senior defense officials during 
these same periods are great examples of these opportunities for more dramatic changes 
in policy and implementation. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future, 249. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
Explaining the forces that drive the changes in American foreign policy is 
difficult given the complex web of politics involving a multitude of actors with differing 
perspectives and agendas.  Examining several periods in the evolution of Sino-American 
military relations policies provides tremendous insight into the fragility of Sino-American 
relations as a whole.  In the context of a post-cold war environment where these two 
nations lacked a common strategic objective that forced greater cooperation, determining 
a long-term strategy for mutually beneficial relations was difficult work. 
Three specific cases best articulate the relationship of domestic forces and Sino-
American military relations policies.  First, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00 NDAA), the current foundation of legal requirements concerning 
military-to-military exchanges and contacts between the United States and the PRC, 
shows how partisan politics shaped foreign military relations policies.  Second, the 
changes in policy and practice during the transitions of presidential administrations show 
how agendas and policies shifted simply as a result of the senior executive change.  
While many would describe administration changes as natural aspects in the American 
democracy, closer examination indicates several changes were driven more by the desire 
to look different from one’s predecessor than by any substantive policy perspectives or 
objective data.  Lastly, changes in the defense community leadership affected not only 
the development of military relations policies but also the implementation of those 
policies over time.  These three cases will be examined in greater detail. 
A. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2000 
A pivotal point in Sino-American foreign relations came in 1998 when reports of 
Chinese espionage in DoD nuclear labs surfaced.  To investigate these allegations 
Congress established the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China led by Congressman 
Cox of California.  Consistent with Kingdon’s conclusions about the roles of Congress 
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and mass media throughout the decision-making process, this committee’s year-long 
investigation and surrounding media attention given to the extent of damage caused by 
Chinese set a tone for the 105th and 106th Congresses that significantly impacted the 
foreign military relations policies of the United States towards the PRC.  It is within this 
context that Congress set about reducing the risks to national security through several 
mechanisms directed at tightening control of sensitive information, increasing DoD 
reporting for improved congressional oversight and prohibiting interactions with the 
Chinese that were deemed as critical to national security.   
The results of Congress’ efforts to preserve national security through legislation 
aimed at military exchanges and contacts with the PRC were addressed in the FY00 
NDAA (P.L. 106-65).  Three specific sections of this law dealt with the PRC: Sections 
914, 1202 and 1201 of P.L. 106-65 (See Appendices 1–3 for the full text of these 
sections).  This document established a formal DoD institution for examining the PLA’s 
capabilities and modernization efforts, outlined several prohibitions concerning military 
contacts, and dictated annual reporting on the PRC from the DoD to Congress who 
retained oversight authority.  
By examining these sections one can gain an appreciation for the influence of 
domestic politics on the Sino-American military relationship.  While section 1201 dealt 
directly with military-to-military contacts, and therefore is the most relevant section to 
this thesis, a review of sections 914 and 1202 also provides additional evidence of the 
partisan context and clues of military responsiveness to Congressional direction as it 
related to the PRC provisions. 
1. Section 914, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 
(CSCMA) 
Section 914, entitled “Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs,” 
compelled the DoD to establish a center dedicated, 
…to study and inform policymakers in the Department of Defense, 
Congress, and throughout the Government regarding the national goals 
and strategic posture of the People’s Republic of China and the ability of 
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that nation to develop, field, and deploy an effective military instrument in 
support of its national strategic objectives.39 
The rationale for such an institution came from a perception of “increasingly tense 
relations”40 between the PRC and the United States and was designed “to provide a 
comprehensive analysis and promote broader understanding.”41   The authors of this 
section advocated increased analysis and reporting of the PRC’s “military affairs and 
strategy…a critical capability not currently available [in the DoD].”42 
 There were clearly two sides on this issue.  Advocates embraced Mearsheimer’s 
later proclamation that “the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense 
security competition with considerable potential for war.”43  With fears that “the Chinese 
now have the capability of threatening us with our own nuclear technology,”44 House 
leaders pushed this section through to increase the level of importance given to 
monitoring China’s modernization efforts.  It appeared that the United States was moving 
in a direction that would place China as the next Soviet Union. 
Opponents of the provision were more in line with Nye’s self-fulfilling prophecy 
comments45 that exposed the dangers of mislabeling the PRC as a threat.  In doing so, the 
United States could push the PRC towards a confrontational stance with the United 
States.  For the opponents, the message behind this requirement set a tone some members 
of Congress found unwarranted and precarious.  As Senator Kerrey (D-NE) stated during 
deliberations about this portion of the NDAA, “I fear that we may be losing touch with 
the reality concerning the size of the threat we face in China relative to the far greater 
                                                 
39 Public Law 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, sec. 914, “Center for the 
Study of Chinese Military Affairs,” 5 October 1999. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 U.S. Congress, House, Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 [to 
Accompany H.R. 1401], 106th Cong., H. Rpt. 106-162, 24 May 1999. 
43 John J. Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, 141 (Jan/Feb 2005): 47. 
44 Carroll J. Doherty, “GOP’s China Gamble: Back Trade, Attack Policy,” CQ Weekly (Washington, D.C.: 
CQ Press, 29 May 1999): 1248. 
45 While serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Joseph Nye cautioned 
United States leaders that fears of China becoming the next world power and threat to the United States could 
lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy if not properly managed. 
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Russian nuclear threat.”46  He went on to say, “the Chinese threat is nowhere near the 
danger that the Russian nuclear threat poses to the people of the United States of 
America.”47   
These concerns were echoed by President Clinton during his signing statement of 
the Act.  The President was,  
…concerned with the tone and language of a number of provisions of [the 
act] relating to China, which could be detrimental to our interests.  The 
Act’s provision establishing the Center for Study of Chinese Military 
Affairs…similar to those previously produced on Soviet military power, 
assumes an outcome…that China is bent on becoming a military threat to 
the United States.”48 
Behind this section of the law, and similar to the findings of the Cox Commission and the 
other provisions drafted in P.L. 106-65, Section 914 was a clear critique of the Clinton 
Administration by the Republican Congress who felt previous attempts to establish a 
China-focused center were inadequate.  That center was the Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies (APCSS) which was founded less than four years earlier. 
In 1995 President Clinton had signed H.R. 4650 which established the APCSS.  
This center,  
…provides a focal point where national officials, decision makers and 
policy makers can gather to exchange ideas, explore pressing issues and 
achieve a greater understanding of the challenges that shape the security 
environment of the Asia-Pacific region.49   
But this center established by Democrats was criticized by the Republicans.  House 
Report 106-162, released by the Republican-controlled HASC stated, 
                                                 
46 U.S. Congress, Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 
S. 1059, Congressional Record, vol. 145, no. 77, daily ed. (26 May 1999), S5982. 
47 Ibid. 
48 President, Signing Statement, “Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2000,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 11 October 1999.  Retrieved from 1999 Presidential 
Documents Online via GPO Access (accessed 6 November 2006). 
49 Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “About Us” statement.  
http://www.apcss.org/graphics/graphic_aboutus.htm (accessed 18 December 2006). 
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Currently the Department of Defense lacks an organization whose primary 
mission is to provide comprehensive analysis and promote broader 
understanding of Chinese military affairs and strategy.  In the committee’s 
judgment, the Asia-Pacific Center is not structured to provide the needed 
perspectives on Chinese military affairs…and is not well sited to provide 
senior policy-makers with timely analysis.50 
Clearly, the committee used this opportunity to blame the Clinton Administration 
for failing to place adequate focus on the Chinese military.  The requirement to establish 
the new center as outlined in the 2000 bill sent a message to the administration that, in the 
view of the Republicans, the Democrats had failed to properly handle the post-cold war 
environment.  The partisan tones and critiques show the influence of domestic politics on 
the policy-making phase of military relations policy.  This section also provides evidence 
of military responsiveness to Congressional requirements through an examination of the 
center’s efforts since its establishment in 2000. 
In the last six years, the center appears to have had only minimal support from the 
DoD.  Returning to the quote above from House Report 106-162, Congress clearly felt 
APCSS was spread too thin to adequately devote attention to the PRC and therefore 
created a center (CSCMA) that would be more narrowly focused.  Yet, given that the 
National Defense University (NDU) has failed to find a permanent director and is using 
an acting director who also serves as the director of CSCMA’s parent organization, the 
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS),51 one would be hard pressed to argue the 
DoD has been responsive to Congress’ intent.  Since its establishment, the center has only 
published eight of the fifty Strategic Forums from INSS, one of seven McNair Papers, 
and only two books.52  Despite the intended “Chinese military affairs” focus, many of 
these publications dealt with issues unrelated to PRC military modernization or strategy.  
Consistent with Allison and Zelikow’s conclusions about bureaucratic resistance, the 
                                                 
50 U.S. Congress, House, Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 [to 
Accompany H.R. 1401], 106th Cong., H. Rpt. 106-162, 24 May 1999. 
51 The Center is under the direct supervision of its Director, who is appointed by the President of NDU and 
reports to the Director of INSS. Unfortunately, Dr. Flanagan serves as the Director of both entities and 
subsequently must devote his attention to a larger span of responsibilities than those of CSCMA. 
52 A complete listing of CSCMA publications can be found at 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/INSS_CSCMA_Pubs.htm (accessed 1 February 2007). 
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center’s minimal contributions to the greater understanding of Chinese military affairs 
provides evidence that the DoD has been successful in avoiding “precise civilian control” 
over its programs.   
It is therefore evident that domestic politics, not necessarily the findings of the 
Cox Commission or any other international event, led to the introduction of this portion 
of the legislation.  The Cox Report simply created an opportunity for the Congress to 
criticize the Clinton Administration’s failed attempts to treat China as a serious concern.  
Unfortunately for those who supported the creation of the CSCMA, it appears that the 
center has failed to yield the results Congress had intended in regards to increasing the 
study of and understanding of Chinese military affairs and strategy, but as opponents 
feared, has labeled the PRC as a threat, in the company of the former Soviet Union. 
2. Section 1202, Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 
The second section of the FY00 NDAA dealing specifically with the PRC was 
Section 1202.  Again, while this section did not directly deal with military-to-military 
relations between the United States and the PRC, an examination of its origins and 
implementation provides evidence of domestic politics’ influence on PRC-related policy 
making and subsequent military responsiveness to Congressional requirements.   
As outlined in this portion of the bill, the DoD would be required to produce an 
annual report on, 
…the current and future military strategy of the People’s Republic of 
China.  The report shall address the current and probable future course of 
military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and 
the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security 
strategy, and military strategy, and of military organizations and 
operational concepts, through the next 20 years.53 
Much like the comments related to the introduction of Section 914, congressional 
advocates felt China was a growing threat while opponents noted that the only one other 
                                                 
53 Public Law 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, sec. 1202, “Annual Report 
on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” 5 October 1999. 
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nation with a similar reporting status was the Soviet Union.  The Congress was caught  
in the Mearsheimer-Nye debate once again. 
From early on in the legislative cycle, the offering of Amendment 394 by Senator 
Lott (R-MS) on 26 May 1999 and the subsequent deliberations of what would become 
Section 1202 were wrought with partisan comments.  Senator Lott’s comments on that 
day were clearly aimed at blaming the Democratic Administration for recent failures of 
counter-intelligence. 
I have stated that the damage to U.S. national security as a result of 
China’s nuclear espionage is probably the greatest I have seen in my entire 
career.  And, unfortunately, the [Clinton] administration’s inattention to—
or even hostility towards—counterintelligence and security has magnified 
this breach.54 
He went on to say, 
It is simply incredible that it took this administration 2 years from the date 
the National Security Adviser was first briefed by DOE officials on the 
problem of Chinese espionage at the nuclear weapons laboratories, to sign 
a new Presidential directive to strengthen counterintelligence at the labs 
and elsewhere.  But this apparently is exactly what happened.55 
And, after all this, it is simply incredible that the President would claim 
that all this damage was a result of actions of previous administrations and 
that he had not been told of any espionage that had occurred on his watch.  
But this is exactly what the President said in a mid-March press 
conference.56 
Further comments about the Clinton Administration by the Senator from Mississippi 
included the words “probe the administration,” “scandal,” “accountable for actions,” and 
                                                 
54 U.S. Congress, Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 




“much to be desired.”57  Other Senators joined in the fray.  Senator Murkowski (R-AK) 
even “dare[d] the President to veto this legislation.”58 
 The Republicans were on a roll.  As one Republican staffer stated, we’re going to 
milk this Chinese espionage issue for all it’s worth.”59  The Senate Majority Leader, 
Senator Lott, acknowledged, “it moves the national political debate onto territory that is 
friendlier for Republicans.”60  By linking the espionage case to the well-recognized and 
ever-present Taiwan issue, the Republicans hoped to gain momentum as the elections 
approached.   
As previously stated, Section 1202 required the DoD to report “on the current and 
future military strategy of the”61 PRC.  Most of this section’s verbiage concerning the 
examination of China’s broad objectives and strategy came from Ney’s (R-OH) 
amendment offered on 26 May 1999,62 but before the end of the cycle Lott’s more 
narrowly-focused amendment (Amdt. 394) was incorporated into this portion of the bill.  
Unlike Ney’s version, Lott’s amendment was solely focused on security in the Taiwan 
Strait.63  If fully incorporated into the law, Amendment 394 would have created a second 
annual report that only dealt with PLA capabilities that could be used against Taiwan.   
Fortunately, Congress recognized this duplicative requirement and rolled to the 
two amendments into one section requiring only one annual report.  Domestic politics 
influenced the creation of an annual reporting requirement the DoD could either embrace 
with full vigor or provide only minimal attention towards.  Unfortunately for Congress, 
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much like the lack of devotion given to the CSCMA, the annual “military power” reports 
that came from the DoD seemed to receive only minimal attention.  Although only three 
lines from Lott’s amendment that focused on PLA capabilities towards Taiwan were 
placed into the text of Section 1202, it appears that the DoD latched on to the ‘Taiwan’ 
issue as the primary focus of its reports from 2000 to 2004. 
While the Taiwan issue remains one of the most worrisome and potentially the 
most explosive problems between the United States and the PRC there are broader issues 
concerning PRC military modernization that warranted reporting as well.  However, in 
the short period since the requirement was established this annual report can arguably be 
described as an example of the DoD doing the minimum to meet the letter of the law.  
This is not to say that the DoD does not put effort into creating these reports.  It is not the 
level of effort that warrants concern, but the scope of effort that remains relevant to 
understanding the DoD’s responsiveness.  While not exactly “shirking,” the annual 
reports from 2000 to 2004 were very similar in content.  The reports focused primarily on 
Taiwan…remaining strictly within the Lott’s portion of the guidelines outlined by the 
2000 bill.64  Not until 2005 did the report address broader regional potential of China’s 
military power.  Even then, those reluctant changes came as a result of significant and 
repeated pressure from the Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, 
who commissioned a close advisor, Michael Pillsbury, to wargame scenarios against the 
PRC nearly five years previous. 65   Eventually, the reports incorporated Marshall’s 
recommendation.  PRC scholars even recognize the narrow focus of these reports and 
slight change in perspective found in the latest reports.66   
Whether this myopic behavior was more a reflection of the limited availability of 
information on PRC military capabilities and strategies or the unwillingness of the DoD 
to embrace the full intent of the law (i.e., provide Congress with necessary information 
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concerning the capabilities and intentions of the PRC to allow for proper congressional 
oversight) remains up for debate.  In either case, it is evident that the military 
modernization efforts in the PRC in the twenty-first century have produced capabilities 
that go beyond the Taiwan scenario and therefore should have been encapsulated in these 
annual reports well before 2006.67 
A review of these first two sections of P.L. 106-65, while not directed focused on 
the military relationship between the United States and the PRC, provides insight into the 
politically charged context in which China-focused sections of this law were developed.  
Congress at the time feared the President’s growing engagement with China was 
exposing some of the nation’s most valuable secrets and technological advantages to 
unnecessary risks.  As a critique of Clinton’s active foreign policy stance regarding the 
PRC, sections 914 and 1202 were developed by the Republican Congress as a signal to 
the President that it wanted to keep a well-informed eye on the executive’s efforts.  Much 
like his predecessor President Bush, Clinton was moving forward as though foreign 
relations policy was solely the executive’s prerogative.68  Congress would hear nothing 
of it and moved forcefully to interject itself back into the process. 
3. Section 1201, Limitations on Military-to-Military Exchanges and 
Contacts with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
The public comments and deliberations related to the above-mentioned sections of 
the law are indicative of the political overtones seen throughout the legislative cycle in 
1999.  Those partisan overtures carried through to the most relevant part of P.L. 106-65:  
Section 1201, which contained direct language about Sino-American military-to-military 
relations.  Specifically, this section placed several prohibitions on military exchanges and 
contacts.  According to this law, the SECDEF may not approve any contacts that would 
create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure in the following areas: 
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1. Force projection operations. 
2. Nuclear operations. 
3. Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations. 
4. Advanced logistical operations. 
5. Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of 
mass destruction. 
6. Surveillance and reconnaissance operations. 
7. Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation 
in warfare. 
8. Military space operations. 
9. Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces. 
10. Arms sales or military-related technology transfers. 
11. Release of classified or restricted information. 
12. Access to a Department of Defense laboratory.69 
But what were the origins of this list and the reasons behind the China-focused 
provisions in the law?  The deliberations concerning this act point to the Report of the 
Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the 
People’s Republic of China (H.R. 105-851),70 commonly known as the Cox Commission 
Report.  This report contained the findings of more than fifteen months of investigation 
into the reported espionage by Chinese officials at defense laboratories in the 1970s, 80s 
and 90s.  In short, the commission concluded that the Chinese had acquired nuclear 
secrets from these laboratories over a three decade period with the most substantial 
breeches occurring in the 90s.71 
While many of the deliberations related to the drafting and passage of P.L. 106-65 
cited the Cox Commission Report as the foundation for many of the requirements and 
restrictions in the law, none of the specific requirements outlined in Section 1201 
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included and of the report’s thirty-eight recommendations.72  However, given the nuclear 
focus of the espionage efforts by the Chinese items two, five and twelve on the list of 
prohibited contacts outlined above seem plausibly related.  The rationale for the other 
prohibitions, however, seems less obvious.  If the Cox Commission Report was not the 
source, how did these items make it into the act? 
Section 1201 of P.L. 106-65 originated in the House of Representatives.  
Introduced by Republican Representative Tom Delay (R-TX), the final verbiage was 
nearly unaltered from the original amendment proposed on 27 May 1999; relatively early 
in the legislative cycle.73  This section provides an interesting example of partisan nature 
of the deliberations throughout the legislative cycle.  There was a clear split along party 
lines concerning this section of the bill.   
Of the 434 words found in DeLay’s portion of the section, less than 10 percent 
were changed in the final version of the bill.  Of those changes made, most were 
additions or word substitutions.  Only three words were removed to change the reporting 
portion of this section from a “five-year plan”74  to “a plan for future contacts and 
exchanges.” 75   Why then, did Democratic Representative Underwood (D-Guam) 
comment near the end of the legislative cycle that, “the Conference Report strips the most 
offensive aspects of the DeLay amendment that was adopted on the floor that would have 
prohibited constructive military to military contacts”?76  Although there was great debate 
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over the benefits and risks associated with curtailing military exchanges with the PLA, it 
is hard to argue that DeLay’s original proposal contained “offensive aspects” given the 
fact that only the “five-year plan” phrase was removed.  It appears that partisan efforts to 
discredit the Majority Whip’s proposal extended to the end of the legislative cycle after a 
conference report was produced, much too late to affect change in the bill.77   
A complementary amendment was offered by Senator John Warner (R-VA) the 
same day DeLay offered his amendment.78  Although DeLay’s amendment required the 
annual reporting of military contacts, Warner’s amendment required a one-time report on 
military contacts from 1993 to 2000.79  Not surprisingly the Warner amendment only 
required historical reporting through the Clinton Administration’s tenure.  In the 
aftermath of the Cox Commission Report where the executive (Democrats) and 
legislative (Republican majority) branches scrambled to place blame for the Chinese 
espionage in defense labs, the duration of Warner’s reporting requirement provides 
evidence of partisan politics at work in the crafting of this bill, as it precisely coincides 
with President Clinton’s tenure in office.   
4. Summary 
Sections 914, 1202 and 1201 are clear examples of the influence of domestic 
politics on the shaping of Sino-American military relations policies and indicate military 
responsiveness to congressional requirements.  The crafting of these portions of the 
legislation is consistent with Allison and Zelikow’s, Kingdon’s, and Feaver’s conclusions 
about the roles of the various actors in the development and implementation of foreign 
relations policies.  Although the impetus for the increased attention given to the PRC 
during the deliberations of the FY00 NDAA came from the Cox Commission Report, the 
requirements outlined in sections 914, 1201 and 1202 were marginally related to the 
espionage events.  The Cox Report appears to have been a matter of convenience for 
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partisan politics to affect change in the military relations policies of the United States 
towards China.  Given that the requirements outlined in sections 914, 1201 and 1202 
were not part the Cox Commission’s thirty-eight recommendations, evidence suggests a 
more political motivation behind the newly introduced sections. 80   While Chinese 
espionage into the United State’s most sensitive military facilities warranted concern, 
Congress’ actions seemed equally motivated by partisan politics.  Despite the recurring 
praise for the bipartisan approach used by Members of Congress in crafting this 
legislation, attempts to blame the Democratic administration for the shortcomings that led 
to the espionage events are hard to miss.  
B. PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION CHANGES 
Aside from the politics infused in the crafting of the FY00 NDAA, changes in 
presidential administrations also influenced the substance of Sino-American military 
relations policies and often resulted in changes in military responsiveness towards those 
policy changes.  Since the inception of informal relations between the United States and 
the PRC during the early 1970s the senior executive has played a critical role in the 
overall foreign relations between the United States and the PRC, but a more limited role 
in the direct dealings of the military relationship.  Before examining the changes in the 
military-to-military relationship between the United States and the PRC during the 
Clinton and Bush eras, it is important to examine the founding of the state-to-state 
relationship under President Nixon and the development of military relations from the 
1970s through 1989. 
Starting in 1969, by order of President Nixon, the United States began to secretly 
explore options of diplomatic recognition of the PRC.81  Travel and trade restrictions that 
had been enforced since the Korean War were lifted that same year.82  Within two years 
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President Nixon, as articulated in his Second Annual Report to the Congress on United 
States Foreign Policy,83 indicated his desire to withdraw the United States’ opposition to 
the PRC taking the United Nations (UN) seat by writing, “I wish to make it clear that the 
United States is prepared to see the People’s Republic of China play a constructive role in 
the family of nations.”84   
Although Nixon’s actions met resistance in Congress by several members who 
feared the changes in policy meant cutting off Taiwan, Nixon continued to move towards 
a conciliatory relationship with mainland China.85  His statements and actions opened the 
door to the PRC taking the rightful seat for China in the international community and 
founded Sino-American informal relations.  While military-to-military relations took 
several years to develop, one central figure played a vital role in these early years that 
would eventually lead to a foundation for military relations between these two nations.  
That man was George Herbert Walker Bush. 
As one of the greatest advocates for an increased relationship with the PRC, Bush 
influenced the relationship well in advance of his presidency.  When the United States 
cleared the way for the PRC to assume the UN seat from Taiwan by no longer opposing 
such a change, Bush was the United States’ Ambassador to the UN.  Soon after, informal 
Sino-American relations were established and Bush assumed duties as Chief of the U.S. 
Liaison Office (de facto Ambassador) to the PRC where he served in Peking from 1974–
76. 86   Immediately following this post, Bush moved to the United States’ lead 
intelligence agency. 
While serving as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Bush was 
selected to be Ronald Reagan’s running mate in the 1980 Presidential election.  Given 
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Bush’s experiences in and with China, this move for Bush appeared to be favorable to the 
Sino-American relationship.  However, during the election campaign Reagan signaled his 
opposition to the Shanghai Communiqué 87  and vowed to reestablish relations with 
Taiwan. 88   With a personal history with many of the PRC’s senior leaders, Bush 
responded quickly by flying to China himself to console his longtime friend Deng 
Xiaoping.89  Despite Reagan’s views that the United States had stronger interests in solid 
relations with Taiwan than with the PRC,90 Bush used his established relationships with 
PRC leaders like Deng and his new post as Vice President to preserve an amicable 
relationship until he assumed the reins as President in 1989.   
Bush’s views of Sino-American relations were more in line with Kissinger and 
Nixon.91  Throughout his tenure as Vice President and later as President, Bush focused 
on a strategic relationship with China, ignoring many of the offensive aspects of the 
PRC’s governance such as human rights violations and treatment of political dissidents.92  
With the Soviet Union as the common threat, the United States and the PRC avoided 
confrontation over such “minor” issues to ensure a cooperative environment  
continued as long as the Soviets posed a threat.   
It was during the early 1980s that military relations with the PRC began.  Despite 
Reagan’s campaign comments, military contacts throughout the 80s were healthy.  In 
1985 alone, there were twenty-three such exchanges between the United States and the 
PRC including trips by the CJCS, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and Air Force Chief of 
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Staff.93  From 1983 to 1988 the SECDEF traveled to the PRC on three occasions and 
hosted a PRC delegation in the United States on at least one occasion.94  “American and 
Chinese military commanders who fought against one another during the Korean War 
crisscrossed the Pacific, offering toasts to the friendship between the PLA and the 
American armed forces.”95 
Yet, military contacts were not the only substantial aspects of the Sino-American 
relationship.  During this same period, arms sales and technology transfers to the PRC 
were unprecedented.  Whereas the first few years of the Reagan Administration presented 
hurdles and obstacles, the mid-80s were a time of flourishing foreign military sales 
cooperation as Reagan loosened restrictions on high-tech transfers to the PRC.  
Commercial entities jumped at the opportunity to sell to the once-closed PRC.  From 
1982 to 1985, export sales leaped from $500 million to over $5 billion.96 
But even as the cold war began to fade in the late 1980s and the Soviet-threat that 
tied the PRC and the United States together began to wane, Bush held fast to a friendly 
relationship with the PRC.  As the early events of Tiananmen Square unfolded in May of 
1989, Bush was notably silent.  He was reluctant to speak out against the Deng regime in 
a manner that might threaten decades of work to build a substantive relationship.  But 
when the massacre of student and worker demonstrators happened on 3 and 4 June 1989 
Bush was forced to respond with condemnation.97  For military relations this event would 
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be the first of many breaks in contact.  Almost immediately Bush suspended arms  
sales to the PRC and cut ties with the PLA.98   
Bush, however, was not ready to give up on the relationship.  With a great 
appreciation for the importance of the Sino-American relationship against a waning but 
remaining Soviet threat, coupled with important foreign military sales programs at risk of 
collapse, Bush risked domestic political criticism and began to reengage the Deng regime 
only three weeks after the Tiananmen events.  Publicly, Bush announced the suspension 
of senior-level visits.99  Secretly, however, Bush sent senior State Department and DoD 
officials to meet with Deng and others in an effort to reopen avenues of communication 
between the two nations.100   
In the following months Bush continued to engage the PRC.  His attempts to keep 
communications open were successful.  At the President’s direction, the State 
Department encouraged “working contacts with PRC military personnel” as long as they 
were “kept low-key and low-profile.”101  But Bush’s attempts to get the Chinese to agree 
to many of his administration’s requests to release Tiananmen detainees and stop arms 
sales to the Middle East were not as successful.  Without public proclamations by the 
PRC articulating its desire to back off its hard-line stance, Bush was alone in his struggle 
to salvage the relationship.  The American public and Congress were calling for more 
harsh sanctions against the PRC.   
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Despite the State Department’s criteria of “low-key and low-profile” contacts, 
Bush’s secret missions to the PRC soon became public and the Democrats in Congress 
used them as opportunity to rebuke the President and his administration.  Further 
engagement efforts by Bush were viewed unfavorably by many in Congress as a 
proclamation that foreign affairs with China was under his charge, not Congress. 102   
The obstacles facing Sino-American relations were founded in the aftermath of 
Tiananmen.  Public outrage and domestic politics complicated the Bush Administration’s 
efforts to find a new foundation for a long-term relationship.  The PRC rebuffed calls for 
democratic reform and dismissed accusations concerning the Tiananmen incident.  The 
cooperation between these two nations remained rocky.  Tied in with political battles 
over human rights, Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, missile technology proliferation 
and intellectual property infringement, military relations took a back seat on the 
President’s agenda.  The continuous battles with Congress from 1990 to 1992 would 
come to a critical juncture during the presidential campaign in 1992.103   
1. President William Jefferson Clinton 
Democrats labeled the Republican Administration as “soft on China.” 104  
Clinton’s campaign criticized Bush for supporting a Chinese regime that advocated 
human rights violations, continued to export missile and nuclear technologies and failed 
to meet its vowed commitments concerning trade and intellectual property reforms.  
When Clinton won the election in 1992, he continued his stance against the leadership in 
Beijing and pressed for stronger measures to show American resolve for a change in the 
practices of the PRC regime.105  Clinton’s position was more a reflection of campaign 
politics than any change in the international order.  As some PRC scholars acknowledged 
political leaders often chose the opposite stance on certain issues simply to look different 
than their political rival. 
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Because of the cycle of electoral politics, when a new president comes to 
power, he always inclines to show differences of policy, distinguished 
from the former president.  This is done out of the purpose of keeping the 
promise made in the campaign and rewarding the supporters and 
consolidating his political base.  It is done also for the sake of clarifying 
his political ideas.106 
Similar to the latter part of the Bush Administration, Clinton was not immune to 
the struggle with Congress over the Sino-American relationship.  Divisions over how to 
deal with a less-than-cooperative PRC existed.  Many advocated continued and increased 
sanctions for the PRC’s missile proliferation while others who were more concerned with 
commercial enterprises pulled at the President to lean towards a more accommodating 
policy.  The commercial sectors needed latitude to deal with China or they faced collapse.  
Similarly, the DoD “missed the pre-Tiananmen contacts with PLA officers.  In general, 
senior officials of the DoD…were ready to resume contact with their Chinese 
counterparts.”107   
Faced with a sluggish economy and the demands of the DoD, Clinton leaned 
toward those in favor of a cautious, but engagement-oriented policy.  By November 1993 
military-to-military contacts resumed for the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
incident when Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman visited the PRC. 108  
Contacts grew steadily.  By 1998, senior level interactions doubled from 13 visits in 1994 
to 26 with a five-year average of nearly 19 per year.109  Military relations were separated 
from the political battles over MFN, human rights, intellectual property infringement and 
political repression.  The events of 1995–1996 confirmed this assertion. 
In the summer of 1995, the PLA began military exercises in the Taiwan Strait.  
Although the exercise itself was only a week long, the tensions and repercussions lasted 
throughout the rest of 1995 and into early 1996.  Clinton responded to the PRC’s 
                                                 
106 Zhang Liping, “The Models of Power Shifts: An Explanation for the Cycle of Ups-and-Downs in Sino-
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107 Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, 230.  
108 Kan, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. – China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 2007, 26. 
109 Derived from Ibid., 26–42. 
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aggressive overtures by sending an aircraft carrier to the region in an effort to show 
American resolve against any forcible change to the current cross-strait situation.  
Undeterred, the PLA massed its forces on the coast near Taiwan.  Clinton responded by 
sending two carrier battle groups to an area near Taiwan in what was the first 
confrontation between American and Chinese forces since Nixon opened 
communications with the CCP in the early 1970s.110   
On the basis of a purely international perspective, one would have expected 
military relations and senior level contact would have ceased during this period, but 
thanks to the diligent work of Clinton’s senior leaders and the foundation laid out by his 
predecessor military contacts continued.  As seen in Figure 2, the United States’ trips to 
the PRC throughout the Taiwan Strait Crises actually rose.  U.S. trips to the PRC more 
than doubled from 1995 to 1996, most of which were led by senior defense leaders at the 
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Figure 2.   Sino-American Military Contacts, 1993–2000111 
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A closer examination of the internationally significant events during the Clinton 
Administration yields more evidence that domestic factors played a more dominant role 
in shaping the military relationship.  Considering the multitude of internationally 
significant events from 1993 to 1996, 112  some of which involved direct military 
confrontation between the United States and the PRC, it is surprising that contacts 
increased from 1993 through 1998.  If these internationally significant events were the 
dominant forces affecting military contacts and exchanges, one would have expected a 
sharp decline in these military contacts throughout the mid-1990s. 
Not until 1999 does it appear that internationally significant events had an impact 
on military relations during the Clinton Administration.  After the NATO-led air mission 
bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, military contacts entered a sharp 
decline.  The PRC immediately declared the suspension of military contacts and denied 
US ship visits to the PRC for the next four months.113  But those public statements and 
actions concerning ship visits were the only visible signs of change.  Less than two days 
after the bombing, the PRC went forward with sending a PLA delegation to Edwards Air 
Force Base in California to discuss “daily planning, integration and control of civilian 
and military [air] operations.”114  
The United States was quick to restore ties as well.  By November, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense and PACOM’s Director for Strategic Planning and Policy 
traveled to the PRC to discuss officially reopening ties.  In December of 1999, both 
nations participated in the previously planned Hong Kong annual search and rescue 
exercise (HKSAREX 99) as they had in years previous.  Less than eight months after the 
bombing, full military exchanges resumed when the PLA’s Deputy Chief of Staff, 
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Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai visited Washington, D.C. in January 2000.115  That 
following year, visits hit an all-time peak of twenty-seven contacts, exchanges, and 
exercises, many of which included the highest officials in both the PRC’s Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) and the DoD (see Figure 2).   
It appears the influence of domestic factors was only usurped by international 
events for a period of less than one year.  As Kingdon argues, the influence of the 
president and his appointees is significant.  Clinton’s advocacy for an overall foreign 
relations policy of ‘comprehensive engagement’ with the PRC appears to have been 
successfully reflected in the military relations policies and practices of the DoD who 
continued to engage the PRC even during or immediately following crises.   
2. President George W. Bush 
The struggle to find a foundation for a long-term relationship with the PRC that 
was immune from the fluctuations in attention given to human rights concerns, unfair 
trade practices and the ever-present Taiwan question dogged President George W. Bush 
as well.  Following his assumption of the presidency, Bush continued to publicly support 
continued engagement with the PRC.  Following the attacks on 9-11, Bush actively 
sought the support of the PRC in the war on terrorism, citing China and other Asia 
nations as “important partners in the global coalition against terror.”116  In his first two 
years as President, Bush traveled to the PRC three times and hosted Hu Jintao at least 
once. 117   Yet, the Bush Administration had a mixed message and a rocky start.  
Unfortunately, despite Bush’s engagement-oriented stance, 2000 was the last year that 
high-level talks/exchanges occurred at such an unprecedented level.  As Figure 3 clearly 
indicates, Sino-American military contacts took a steep downturn in 2001.   
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Figure 3.   Total Sino-American Military Contacts, 2000–2006118  
 
Unlike previous crises, such as the Taiwan Strait in the mid-90s and the Belgrade 
bombing 1999, there was no rebound in contacts over the long term.  While the EP-3 
incident is a natural explanation for such a dramatic decline, consideration of other, 
longer-term evidence suggests other factors impacted the relationship in a more enduring 
fashion.  
Throughout the EP-3 incident the Bush Administration was clearly involved in 
direct negotiations with the PRC for the release of the crew and the aircraft itself.  But, 
there are no indications that the President himself made any attempts to call Jiang Zemin 
in order to aid the stalemate.119  Making a tense period worse, in late April 2001, when 
asked about the United States’ position on Taiwan, Bush declared the United States 
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would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.” 120   Years of strategic 
ambiguity over the ‘one-China’ policy were abruptly halted in this simple response.  The 
President’s senior advisors and diplomats quickly responded to ‘clarify’ Bush’s remarks 
and put the PRC at ease, but the effects were hard to mitigate with a few personal 
assurances from the DoD and State Department. 
Other circumstances forced Bush’s hand to impose sanctions for a variety of 
events including accusations of PRC proliferation of chemical weapons and cruise 
missiles to Iran as well as missile proliferation to Pakistan.  Between 2001 and June 2006 
the Bush Administration imposed sanctions against the PRC twelve times for 
proliferation of chemical weapons, cruise missiles and conventional weapons to Iran.121  
Military relations suffered accordingly.  From 2001 through 2006, fewer than fifteen 
visits occurred annually…almost half the level seen under Clinton (see Figure 3).  With 
the 1999 Belgrade bombing and 2001 EP-3 incident long past, one would have expected 
a quick rebound and resumption of contacts at a level similar to the 1990s, yet contacts 
under the Bush Administration would continue to lag. 
3. Summary 
The ability of the executive branch to influence the foreign relations policies of 
the United States is unmistakably momentous.  Over the last four decades, American 
Presidents have broadened and narrowed the Sino-American relationship for a wide 
variety of reasons, some of which had little to do with anything more than domestic 
politics.  Intertwined with the overall policy stance changes from ‘containment’ to 
‘engagement’ from one administration to another was the military-to-military relations 
policy between the MOD and the DoD.   
Zhang Liping described the evolution of American foreign policy throughout any 
given president’s tenure and during the transition from one administration to another very 
clearly. 
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Generally speaking, the first year can be termed the ‘intern year,’ 
particularly for a new president who lacks in the diplomatic experience 
and cannot understand the complex[ity] of Sino-US relations…The second 
and third years can be called ‘the window of opportunity’ to improve the 
relations between China and the US.  During the period, the new president 
feels at home in the White House and has accumulated some sense 
through the summits.  Now that his appointees have filled the positions, he 
has access to information necessary to decision-making.  He then has a 
leeway power in handling foreign policy.  In the fourth year of the term, 
the president has become ‘lame duck’ and he has fewer resources to take 
the risky and aggressive maneuver.  The president who wants to campaign 
for reelection sometimes makes ‘irrational’ policy.  As the head of the 
political party, he must defend his policy and try to leave nothing wrong 
for the challenging party to blame.122 
The executive-led shifts in policy from 1969 to present day fit into this 
description.  Although President Clinton vowed to take a more hard line stance with the 
PRC during his election campaign and during his first term, Figure 2 suggests otherwise.  
From 1993 to 1998, military contacts increased steadily.  Even through the Taiwan Strait 
Crises in 1995 and 1996 military contacts increased.  Not until the mistaken bombing of 
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 did contacts significantly drop and in that case 
it was the PRC, not the United States who publicly declared the suspension of 
contacts.123 
 Again, despite Clinton’s vows for a stronger stance on PRC human rights and 
proliferation policies his use of sanctions was limited if not absent.  As Cohen argued, the 
influences of commercial enterprise, lobby groups and governmental agencies that 
favored stronger economic relations won over Clinton’s initial plans for a stronger 
position.124  When Bush assumed the Presidency that trend changed. 
 In 2001, the mid-year EP-3 incident curtailed military contacts to the lowest 
levels since contacts resumed in 1993.  While those contacts rebounded shortly thereafter 
they never reached the levels of exchange and contact seen during the Clinton 
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Administration.  From 2001 to 2006, Bush publicly called for continued engagement with 
the PRC, specifically calling for increased strategic military dialogues and exchanges.125  
Given Bush’s public statements one would have expected a marked rebound of contacts 
to levels similar to the 1990s.  Yet, with the decrease in contacts it appears other factors 
and/or actors influenced the military relations between these two nations.  In the case of 
the Bush Administration, it was possible that the translation of the overall foreign policy 
stance of engagement did not translate into a DoD military relations practice that 
reflected the overall policy or, consistent with Allison and Zelikow’s description of 
bureaucratic resistance, the DoD bureaucracy distorted the outcomes in such a way that 
they no longer reflected the President’s intent.  It appears that unlike Clinton’s tenure, 
senior defense leaders under Bush had their own thoughts on what levels of exchange 
were appropriate given the benefits versus risks debate. 
C. SENIOR DEFENSE LEADERSHIP CHANGES 
The changes in congressional majority and presidential administrations had 
obvious effects on the overall foreign relations policies of the United States.  Yet changes 
within the DoD also had impacts on the development of those policies and more 
importantly on their implementation in the military realm.  Given the proximity of the 
most senior officials within the DoD to the political actors in Washington, D.C., their 
nomination by the executive and confirmation by the Senate, there is little surprise that 
the ebbs and flows in military relations often reflected partisan shifts in power.126  While 
many of the senior defense officials, specifically general and flag officers, remain 
staunchly apolitical, the overwhelming presence of D.C. politics makes immunity from 
partisan influences unlikely.  With more than twenty political appointees in OSD and  
 
 
                                                 
125 The President’s News Conference…; and “Chinese, U.S. Presidents Agree to Further Promote Ties,” 
China View, 19 November 2006.  
126 For the purposes of this thesis, “senior defense officials” include Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Deputy 
Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries and four-star Generals within OSD and the 
Services.  For an explanation of the political appointment process, see Cheryl Y. Marcum, Department of 
Defense Political Appointments: Positions and Process, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 
 48
similar numbers in each of the Services charged with civilian oversight of the DoD 
(coupled with hundreds of other civilian leaders in senior positions), the influence of 
partisan politics cannot be ignored. 
Despite these influences, evidence suggests that some senior officials remained at 
a distance from the politics of Washington to focus on continuous, constructive 
engagement at any and every level.  The most visible and outspoken military official in 
this regard has been the CDRUSPACOM.  Other leaders, such as the SECDEF and CJCS 
also played important roles in developing and implementation military-to-military 
relations with the PRC over the last four decades but seem more responsive to political 
influences.  Each of these posts and their impacts on Sino-American military relations 
will be evaluated individually. 
1. CDRUSPACOM 
Of the major actors described in Chapter II, the Commander, US Pacific 
Command (CDRUSPACOM) is the official with the most equity in preserving a strong 
and stable military relationship with the PRC.  The CDRUSPACOM has responsibility 
for preparing for conflicts that threaten United States’ interest in the largest geographic 
combatant command within the DoD.  Irrespective of the political shifts in Washington 
the CDRUSPACOM was faced with the diametrically opposed tasks of preparing for 
military conflict in the Asia-Pacific (which could involve armed conflict against the PRC) 
and with developing and implementing a favorable military relationship with this 
possible adversary. 
While preparing for the worst and working for the best, the CDRUSPACOM has 
historically been one of the greatest advocates for increased transparency, cooperation 
and contact.127  Given the vested interest of PACOM who would bear the brunt of the 
effort to thwart any aggression by the PLA, CDRUSPACOM’s calls for mechanisms that 
reduce the likelihood of conflict appear natural.  Admiral Fallon claimed, “In the Asia- 
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Pacific area, I can think of no other issue that looms as large as the relationship between 
the U.S. and China.”128  In testimony before Congress in 2006, the Commander went 
further to say, 
Given the complex and extensive relationship between the U.S. and PRC 
and the expressed desire to deepen the military relationship between us by 
the political leaders of both countries, PACOM has been strongly 
advocating a reinvigorated military-to-military relationship in a variety of 
areas.  We have sought to focus in areas of common interest but have 
made clear to PLA leaders that the relationship should be guided by 
principles of transparency and reciprocity.129 
…military to military ties have lagged.  We are working hard now to 
change the vector in this area, to encourage Chinese military leaders to 
substantively engage with us in a more transparent manner.  In my 
discussions with PLA military leaders, they indicated a willingness to 
reciprocate.  It is important to advance our mutual military relationship, 
not only to ease tension and suspicion but to encourage, by example, 
Chinese participation in the full range of international engagement.130 
Only a few weeks later in a speech in April 2006 Admiral Fallon continued to 
express his concerns over reduced contact between the DoD and MOD since 2001.  From 
his perspective, “without these contacts fears and assumptions abound.  There is a need to 
prevent miscalculations of PRC and United States intent.”131 
Admiral Fallon’s comments are consistent with his recent predecessors who 
advocated increased military-to-military contact, exchange and cooperation. 132  
Naturally, by their position, these commanders had direct contact with and interest in 
China relations and therefore would be expected to be strong advocates of increased ties, 
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cooperation and formal mechanisms established to diffuse crises.  In the event of 
confrontation with the PRC, the CDRUSPACOM would lead the U.S. effort against the 
PLA and therefore, has the greatest burden of risk when relations subside or when 
uncontrolled exchanges results in sensitive information transferring from the United 
States to the PRC.  The development of stable relations founded in well-defined 
objectives and limits, with clear lines of communication and with crisis management 
mechanisms in place reduce the risk of escalating confrontation as a result of mishaps 
such as the EP-3 incident.   
 
Figure 4.   CDRUSPACOM Visits to the PRC133 
 
As Figure 4 indicates, over the tenure of the last six commanders, consistent 
engagement persisted even through significant international events, increases in U.S.-
imposed sanctions, and presidential administration changes.  Averaging one visit a year, 
the CDRUSPACOM has engaged some of the most-senior leaders in the PLA and PRC 
central government.  The two spikes in travel to the PRC can be best explained by 
examining the details of those visits.  The first spike, in 1998, reflects visits by Admiral 
Prueher.  During his first two years as CDRUSPACOM, Prueher travel only once per 
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year, however, in his last year in this post, Prueher traveled three times in a single year.  
Considering the Admiral assumed duties as United States’ Ambassador to the PRC in 
1999,134 his increased travels to China appear to be in anticipation of his next post, not a 
change in his stance as CDRUSPACOM.  The second spike in 2000 can more easily be 
explained as a changing of the guard.  In that year, Admiral Fargo assumed command 
from Admiral Blair.  Blair traveled to the PRC just prior to the end of his tour and Fargo 
traveled within the first few months of his tenure.135 
Similar to the consistency of CDRUSPACOM visit frequency, United States’ ship 
visits to the PRC remained relatively stable and nearly matched the level of contacts by 
the CDRUSPACOM himself.  As Figure 5 shows, there appears to be a direct correlation 
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Figure 5.   CDRUSPACOM Visits Compared to US Ship Visits to the PRC136 
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Even with Fallon’s advocacy, and that of his predecessors, PACOM’s consistent 
but stagnant efforts were not without criticism.  The media pressed the Commander for 
more tangible indicators of progress.  An Associated Press reporter asked, “the United 
States and China have been [emphasizing the need for increased transparency] for quite a 
long time and not made a lot of practical exchanges...did you make any commitments to 
anything like joint exercises…”137  Fallon responded by highlighting the recent contacts 
between SECDEF, the President and the PRC President over the last year and noting the 
complexity of working out the details of increased military contacts but failed to 
acknowledge the limited progress and remaining SECDEF resistance.138 
Consistent with the conclusions of Kingdon, as well as Allison and Zelikow the 
CDRUSPACOM has had greater influence on the implementation phase than on policy 
development.  As shown above, when Fallon’s wishes appeared to deviate from those in 
Washington, he was able to continue engagement with the PRC.  Removed from much of 
the politics in Washington the CDRUSPACOM appears to have maintained a steady push 
for contacts.  As seen in Figure 2 during the Clinton Administration, senior defense 
official contacts steadily increased despite the political battles throughout Clinton’s eight-
year tenure.  Much of that increase can be attributed to the advocacy of the 
CDRUSPACOM. 
2. SECDEF 
The SECDEF is the only actor in the chain of command between the 
CDRUSPACOM and the President.139  By his position alone, it is obvious that he has a 
significant opportunity to impact military relations.  In the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
Square incident it was then SECDEF Cheney who “recommended the defense 
relationship take the brunt of the punitive cutbacks…the military-to-military relationship 
                                                 
137 Fallon, Media Press Conference. 
138 Ibid. 
139 While the CJCS is part of the chain of command between the SECDEF and the combatant commanders, 
the CJCS does not have Command Authority (COCOM) and therefore, primarily serves in an advisory and 
coordinating role.  COCOM goes directly from the President to the SECDEF to the combatant commanders. 
 53
should be suspended so that other aspects of the relationship could be sustained.”140  His 
recommendations were approved and implemented accordingly. 
However, if one merely uses frequency data to assess the impacts of this actor on 
Sino-American military relations, one might conclude the SECDEF has not been active in 
the relationship.  As Figure 6 shows, SECDEF trips to the PRC are rare.  Since 1993, the 
SECDEF has traveled to the PRC only five times.  If, however, one considers the number 
of PLA delegations that had audience with the SECDEF during their visit to the United 
States, those numbers appear more promising for a favorable relationship.   
 
Figure 6.   SECDEF Contacts with the PLA141 
 
Going back to SECDEF Perry’s 1994 visit with PLA Deputy Chief of Staff, General Xu 
Huizi, it is clear that the Secretary supported improved military relations and put himself 
personally into the equation to achieve such a relationship.  A declassified document 
from OSD to the American Embassy in Beijing concerning Perry’s private meeting with 
Xu summarized the conversation as follows,  
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SECDEF told Xu that one of his objectives as Secretary of Defense is to 
improve this mutually beneficial relationship with the PLA, and he is 
heartened by the progress since the important visit by ASD Freeman to 
Beijing…142 
By 1998, SECDEF Cohen endorsed “The United States Security Strategy for the 
East Asia-Pacific Region.”  This report called for “comprehensive engagement”143 with 
the PRC.  This document stated, “Dialogue and exchanges can reduce misperceptions 
between our two countries, increase our understanding of Chinese security concerns, and 
build confidence between our two defense establishments to avoid military accidents and 
miscalculations.”144 
Similarly, in 2001 DEPSECDEF Wolfowitz’ report to Congress (as directed in 
Sect 1201 of P.L. 106-65) stated the objectives of Sino-American military relations as  
…attempting to foster an environment conducive to frank, open discussion 
PRC and U.S. delegations conducted several exchanges that 
complemented the broader efforts to engage the PRC.  They were also 
meant to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation regarding cross-strait 
issues.145 
The DoD began to realize that open dialogue was growing increasingly important.  Yet 
these public statements and documents projected arrogance by the United States that its 
values and global views should be embraced by all other nations.  But if one favors 
increased military-to-military relations between the PRC and the United States revised 
objectives appear necessary.  In 2002, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas 
Feith, made statements that offered an alternative to the ‘influence-oriented’ objectives 
seen for most of the 1990s.  He said,  
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...the principal interest is in reducing the risks of mistake, miscalculation, 
and misunderstanding.  If these military-to-military exchanges actually 
lead to our gaining insights into Chinese thinking and policies and 
capabilities and the like, and they can gain insights into ours, then it 
doesn’t mean we’ll necessarily agree on everything, but it at least means 
that as we’re making our policies, we’re making them on the basis of 
accurate information….And we’re in favor of exchanges that will 
accomplish that purpose.  What we’re not in favor of are exchanges that 
are showcase pieces, that suggest that there’s real cooperation when 
there’s not real cooperation, or that don’t really afford, you know, a 
significant learning experience to the people participating in the 
exchanges. 146 
Here, the DoD promoted a relationship that appeared more balanced.  The previous 
objective of influencing the PRC seen in previous documents and statements were 
subsiding and the new direction of the DoD appeared more consistent with the Chinese 
views on foreign military relations.   
Yet a lot of domestic and international events have occurred since Perry’s tenure 
as SECDEF.  With the events of 9-11 the influence of the SECDEF on United States 
policy formulation and development rose to levels unseen in the last thirty years.147  
Specifically, Secretary Rumsfeld’s persona and reputation for candor placed increased 
attention on his views in the media.  While many of his comments were naturally 
highlighted domestically, Rumsfeld’s speeches, press conferences and news releases had 
an audience internationally as well.  President Bush’s close relationship with Rumsfeld 
bolstered his status and gave greater weight to his comments as a reflection of not only 
his personal views,148 but the views of the entire DoD and in some regard, the United 
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States as a whole.  Subsequently, the “SECDEF’s attitude toward China [as expressed 
through these public statements] has signals for the PRC.”149   
Because the United States lacks a clear and consistent policy regarding 
China, influential elite watch official speeches, statements and reports 
closely to determine just what US policy toward China is or will be.  What 
they see is substantial proof that the United States policy-makers have 
widely accepted the ‘theory of the China threat.’  What is so frustrating to 
China’s influential elite is the lack of evidence on which the widespread 
acceptance of the China threat theory is based.150 
In a speech before the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore in 
2005 Rumsfeld’s comments sent strong signals of American concern over China’s 
military modernization, arms expansion and increased deployments. 151   Rumsfeld’s 
remarks left a big impression in Asia that the United States was becoming increasingly 
concerned with China’s economic and military modernization.  As one Chinese scholar 
wrote, 
At a regional security conference in Singapore in early June of 2005, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld argued in his keynote address that 
China’s investment in missiles and up-to-date military technology posed a 
risk not only to Taiwan and to American interests, but also to nations 
across Asia.152 
In the aftermath of these statements other officials such as Fallon attempted to diffuse the 
concerns by placing them in a greater context of optimism.153  However, the lasting 
impression left many in the PRC confused about the road ahead for military relations.   
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If Rumsfeld’s recent comments where misconstrued, his pattern of actions 
throughout his tenure were less ambiguous.  Following the EP-3 incident in 2001 it was 
Rumsfeld who ordered a halt to Sino-American military contacts and established 
procedures that required future visits to be personally reviewed and approved by his 
office.154  A year later, Rumsfeld declined an invitation to visit the PRC, sending lower-
level officials instead. 155   The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
endorsed by the SECDEF and published in 2006, contained for the first time a section 
focused on China alone.  The report cited China as the only potential competitor to the 
United States.156 
Given Rumsfeld’s substantial influence and autonomy within the cabinet, coupled 
with Kingdon’s views on the influence of presidential appointees on the agenda setting 
phase of decision making, Figure 3 may now be better explained.  Since it appeared that 
Bush promoted an engagement-oriented foreign policy with the PRC similar to Clinton 
and that the EP-3 incident had only a temporary impact on the military relationship, 
perhaps the views of the SECDEF had the greater impact on military contacts.  As Figure 
7 shows, the level of military contact since 1993 not only reflected changes in executive 
leadership, but also coincided with Rumsfeld’s reappointment to the position of 
SECDEF.  If Bush promoted an engagement-oriented policy and gave Rumsfeld 
autonomy to implement that policy, it appears that it was Rumsfeld’s cautious views that 
curtailed military contacts during the start of the twenty-first century.  During the Bush 
Administration it appears the DoD was less responsive to the principal’s direction than 
was the case during the Clinton Era. 
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Figure 7.   Total Sino-American Military Contacts157  
 
3. CJCS 
To a lesser extent the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) played a role in 
articulating military relations policies and participating in their execution.  As the 
principal military advisor to the President,158 the CJCS played a visible role in expressing 
the administration’s views concerning military contacts with the PRC.  In the past decade 
the CJCS has also made overtures toward greater military cooperation with the PRC.  
Nearly ten years previous to Fallon’s testimony, General Shalikashvili’s remarks before 
the National Defense University in Beijing were similar. 
…our two nations are pursuing military-to-military ties to improve 
communications, reduce potential misunderstandings and carry out 
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will be symbolically important, even if relatively simple affairs… But at 
the same time, there are aspects of our military-to-military ties that are 
more substantive.159 
President Clinton said that we are anxious to see a China that is ‘stable 
politically and open economically, that respects human rights and the rule 
of law, and that becomes a full partner in building a secure international 
order.’  The mutual interests of China and the United States demand better 
understanding, clearer communications, greater confidence and deeper 
cooperation.  And military-to-military contacts must be an essential part of 
all that.160  
These prepared remarks in Beijing were a direct reflection of the Clinton 
Administration’s policies.  Shalikashvili’s comments were given at the height of senior-
level contacts during the Clinton years and reflected Clinton Administration policy.  The 
same was true of Chairman General Myers during his tenure in the Bush Administration.  
As Bush’s sanctions on China increased, contacts decreased and CJCS comments were 
limited.  During Myers’ tenure from 2001 to 2005, very few public comments, news 
releases or prepared remarks spoke of military relations’ policies with the PRC.161 
The CJCS position was designed to “be a clear and independent voice, providing 
the best military advice in an apolitical, non-partisan manner.”162  So then, one might ask 
if CJCS comments in recent years were genuine beliefs of the Chairman or simply a 
reflection of Administration views.  Unfortunately, given the greater responsibilities of 
the CJCS, the role of the CJCS in Sino-American military relations policy and 
implementation was limited (compared to that of the SECDEF and CDRUSPACOM).  
Making any reliable conclusions about the CJCS’ influence on Sino-American military 
relations is difficult.  Since 1994 the CJCS only traveled to the PRC three times:  
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General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
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Shalikashvili in 1997, Shelton in 2000 and Myers in 2004…hardly enough to measure 
trends.163  What is clear, however, is that the public statements from those holding this 
post rarely, if ever, diverged from the views of the SECDEF.  A sampling of the press 
conferences, testimony and public statements by the CJCS concerning China from 1997 
to 2006 showed no sign of dissent between the SECDEF and the CJCS.164  
4. Summary 
The influence of senior defense officials on the military relations policies and 
practices of the United States cannot be taken lightly.  From the evidence presented 
above, it appears changes in the SECDEF directly impacted the implementation of 
national policy.  During the Clinton Era, the SECDEF was closely aligned with the views 
of the President.  Yet, once Rumsfeld took over during the Bush Administration, given 
the latitude afforded him, the DoD responsiveness to the President’s engagement-oriented 
policies seemed to wane.  Despite and overall foreign policy of engagement, the military 
held a more reserved stance with limited exchanges in comparison to the previous 
administration’s level of engagement.   
Unlike the SECDEF, the CDRUSPACOM appears to have held a more consistent 
advocacy of military engagement with the PRC despite changes in the executive branch, 
legislative majority and shifts in overall foreign relations policies coming from 
Washington, D.C.  But actions taken by other actors involved in military relations policy 
making and implementation, especially those at a level below the SECDEF, such as the 
CDRUSPACOM, were sometimes viewed as rhetoric given the SECDEF’s clear and 
public statements that contradicted the actions of lower-level actors.  For example, while 
Admiral Fallon openly encouraged increased military exchange and promoted more 
transparency with the PRC, comments by SECDEF that indicated the PRC remained a 
threat countered Admiral Fallon’s comments and practices.  The Chinese, rightfully so, 
                                                 
163 Kan, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. – China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 2007, 5. 
164 A review of more than twenty press releases, transcripts, press conferences and public statements by the 
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placed greater weight on Rumsfeld’s comments.165  It is these types of contradictions and 
shifts in policy that have negatively impacted the ability of the United States and the PRC 
to establish a strategic military relationship. 
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In the last decade, fears over China’s economic growth and increased regional and 
global influence have dominated the agenda of many scholars, think tankers, public 
officials and the media.  The President, Congress, DoD, and non-governmental actors 
have debated how to treat the PRC over the last few decades.  However, the polarized 
debate that has vacillated between seeing China as a “friend” and “foe” for years appears 
to have increasingly leaned toward perceptions of a “China threat” in the last decade.   
Many consider Bill Gertz as an authoritative source on the inner-workings of the 
various actors in Washington, D.C. 166   His articles generally reflect the views and 
concerns of those with the greatest equity and interest in the Sino-American relationship.  
From 2003 to 2005 alone, even during the height of the Iraq War, the percentage of his 
articles relating to the fears of China’s rise went from 8 percent to 41 percent.167  Given 
Gertz’ credibility as an author who accurately expresses the views of Washington, D.C., 
one can argue that the fears of the major actors in Sino-American relations have risen at a 
corresponding rate.  Consistent with this assertion, the recent hearing held by the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission was wrought with testimony from 
senior DoD and State Department officials who are increasingly fearful of China’s 
growing influence and the lack of United States appropriate, more aggressive 
response.168 
As Richard Weitz wrote, the “…bilateral defense relationship has traditionally 
served as a proverbial canary in the coal mine, acutely vulnerable to harmful 
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environmental changes.”169  With the end of a common enemy in the Soviet Union, the 
United States and the PRC have failed to find common ground that would have created 
an enduring relationship free from the ebbs and flows of domestic politics.  Both nations 
faced internal pressures to manage the Sino-American military relationship through 
inconsistent means and fluctuating objectives.  In many cases, the President, Congress, 
and other political actors use the DoD as a tool to signal American displeasure with PRC 
policies and practices. 
For the Chinese, the objectives of foreign military relations center on gaining 
increased knowledge that enhance their military modernization efforts and, 
correspondingly, their regional and global position.  For the United States, the objectives 
lean towards influencing the behavior of the PRC more in line with United States’ global 
and regional interests.  These conflicting approaches and the infusion of domestic factors 
are the largest obstacle in Sino-American military relations. 
A.  FINDINGS 
Recent history suggests the determinants of Sino-American military relations 
policies rest mostly in the realm of domestic politics.  Based on this cursory examination 
of the major actors in United States foreign military relations policies and the 
implementation of those policies since President Nixon’s initiation of renewed 
engagement with the PRC, some observations can be made: 
• The CDRUSPACOM has been the most engaged and consistent advocate of 
increased military-to-military relations across a broad spectrum of contacts regardless 
of the temperament in Washington, D.C.; 
• While internationally significant events had an impact on military relations for a year 
or two, the more significant and enduring shifts in military-to-military policy have 
been driven by domestic politics and changes in defense leadership; 
• Despite claims of “gaining momentum” by many of the actors in both the PRC and 
United States, military-to-military contacts appear no better off in 2006 than in the 
1980s 
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These findings, however, are incomplete.  Further qualitative and quantitative 
research is needed to fully validate these observations. 
B. NEED FOR FURTHER STUDY 
What has not been adequately examined in this thesis or in recent works is a more 
in-depth measurement of military responsiveness.  While anecdotal and cursory evidence 
such as that found in Kan’s 2007 report,170 indicates that senior defense officials “towed 
the party line,” a more vigorous examination of lower-level contacts and exchanges 
suggests a more consistent level of contact that is immune to the ebbs and flows in 
overarching military relations policies.  Gaining access to the DoD annual military-to-
military reports sent to Congress and evaluating the DoD database that contains more 
detailed information on every defense traveler to the PRC (as developed as a result of the 
requirements found in the 2000 NDAA) would be crucial steps towards filling this void.   
It may be presumed that the information in this database would contain the rank 
of every member traveling, the reason for the visit, expected counterpart interactions and 
duration of visit.  From these data one may employ trend analysis to determine the 
changes in the frequency of contacts, the level of contact by military grade/rank, and the 
substance of contacts.  With this information, coupled with the official policy changes 
and political/defense leader statements over time, one may better assess the military’s 
responsiveness to changes in policy.  Additionally, one may assess the nature of past 
military contacts as they related to the DoD’s stated objectives.  It may be determined 
whether military contacts were in line with stated objectives or if those contacts failed to 
make progress towards achieving those objectives.  Unfortunately, the database that 
compiles this information is classified and therefore beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Additional research would need to be done at the appropriate classification level. 
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In addition to information obtained from a more detailed analysis of the DoD 
database on defense travelers to the PRC, reviews of the annual DoD reports to Congress 
on the current state of Sino-American military-to-military contacts, as required by Sect. 
1201(e) of P.L. 106-65, would also provide more detailed information that would 
enhance the evidence presented in this thesis.  Unfortunately, all but the 2001 and 2006 
reports are classified.  The 2001 report was the first of its kind and therefore had little 
useful information relating to qualitative or quantitative analysis.  The 2006 report, 
however, contained substantially more detailed information that would allow researchers 
more in-depth evidence of DoD contacts.   
For example, while Kan’s report lists 14 military contacts for 2005, the DoD 
report shows 44 contacts for the same year.  Kan acknowledges that her report excludes 
lower-level contacts such as academic exchanges and multilateral conferences, which 
predominate in the 2006 DoD report. 171   Obviously, given the 30-visit difference 
between the two sources, the occurrence of lower-level and multilateral contacts is 
significant.  Given the disparity between these two sources, and the fact that only one of 
the DoD reports was available, the DoD data were not incorporated into this study.  Since 
inclusion of the more-detailed DoD data for 2005 would have placed an artificial spike in 
the trend data, they were excluded.  In order to gain a better understanding of the actual 
levels of military exchange and contact between these two nations, future studies must 
include all contacts and therefore, must be at the classified level.   
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This brief review of the historical contacts between the DoD and the MOD 
provides a perspective on the development of military relations policies and the 
influences of the major actors involved in that development and subsequent 
implementation.  Unfortunately, this thesis only adds to a long line of publications that 
have advocated change to the Sino-American military relationship.  Since the 1980s, 
numerous authors, scholars and defense leaders have called for changes in policy and 
implementation with little resultant change in the United States. 
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However, based on this review and with the goal of improved relations, some 
recommendations for future military relations policies and practices can be formulated 
and are presented with the hope that one day, changes can and will occur.  Specifically, 
the United States can revise its objectives, open new opportunities for contact, eliminate 
the notion of reciprocity and dismiss calls for legislative change. 
1. Revised Objectives 
While the United States continually demands increased transparency from the 
PRC, it is the United States that has lacked clear direction for its military relations with 
the PRC.  In this case, the PRC was very clear about what it hoped to gain from military 
relations with every nation it engaged.  Its goals are worth restating. 
• To shape the international environment in support of key Chinese 
national security objectives 
• To improve political and military relations with foreign countries 
• To enhance China’s military and defense industry modernization 
• To provide military assistance to countries in the developing world 
• To acquire knowledge in modern military doctrine, operations, 
training, military medicine, administration, and a host of non-combat 
related areas (emphasis added)172 
Unfortunately, since the 1980s, the United States has been less than clear in 
defining its objectives for military relations with the PRC.  In 1994 several policy 
documents, official testimonies and public statements provide clues to the objective of 
military relations but no single document clearly describes the United States’ objectives.  
However, starting in the mid- to late 1990s one can see a common thread in all of these 
sources: the desire to shape and influence the behavior of the PRC. 
By the end of the 1990s, the DoD was beginning to provide clearer indications of 
its objectives.  In briefing Congress in March 1997, the DoD said the objectives of mil-
to-mil relations were to: 
• Increase PLA transparency; 
• Demonstrate U.S. military capabilities; 
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• Advance U.S.-PRC security dialogue through discussions with PLA 
leadership; 
• Develop confidence building measures (CBMs) designed to reduce 
chances of miscalculations and accidents between operational forces; 
• Pursue bilateral functional exchanges that are beneficial to DoD and 
the U.S. military (e.g., military medicine) and/or that provide 
operational insights on the PLA; 
• Routinize senior-level defense dialogue to ensure open 
communications during tensions; 
• Monitor the PLA’s influence in PRC internal politics and foreign 
policy decision-making; and 
• Expand PLA participation in appropriate multinational and multilateral 
military activities173 
The first objective seeks to alter PRC practice and calls for increased 
transparency…a theme that would not subside over time.  Unfortunately, as Lampton 
points out, “…transparency is not universally beneficial or applicable, particularly as it 
may expose the vulnerabilities of weak nations.”174  The second objective, while not 
explicit, also seeks to alter PRC behavior.  This objective aims at showing the PRC just 
how capable the U.S. armed forces are with the hope that the obvious gap between these 
two nations’ militaries would have a deterrent effect on the PRC.  The United States 
hopes that the PRC will realize the gap is wide and nearly insurmountable and will 
therefore give up all efforts to catch up with the only remaining superpower.   
Unfortunately for the United States the opposite has been true.  Instead of 
withdrawing from modernization plans, the PRC has focused more effort into countering 
the U.S. military might, not through an arms race, but by identifying key vulnerabilities 
and developing counter-effects that would prey on United States’ critical nodes.175   
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The last objective presented to Congress continues this “influence strategy” by 
attempting to push the PRC into greater participation in international military regimes 
and protocols.  Again, the United States, while clearer in its stated objectives than in 
previous years, still rests its success in the hands of the PRC.  Unfortunately, all of these 
statements measured success as the ability of the United States to influence the PRC.   
Future objectives should focus on clearly stating Washington’s goals in the Asia-
Pacific, reducing suspicion between both militaries, and learning from one another.  
Taking the goals of “changing behavior” or “influencing the other party” out of military-
to-military contact objectives increases the chances of mutual understanding.  
Recommending new strategies and implementation mechanisms without a set of new, 
clearly-stated and consistent objectives remains a futile task.   
2. Future Contact Opportunities 
Like the United States, PRC military exchange opportunities are often highly 
controlled by senior political and defense leaders to ensure continued secrecy and 
security and are subject to domestic and international events of change.  For instance, 
following the 1995–6 Taiwan Strait Crises, the Chinese Minister of Defense stopped 
travel to the United States for more than seven years.176  Similarly, following the 2001 
EP-3 collision with a Chinese fighter jet, some high-level military exchanges (senior 
colonels through major general) were curtailed for nearly three years. 177   Several 
specialties, such as intelligence, have been strictly prohibited from travel outside the PRC 
entirely while the member served on active duty.178   
This latter restriction in some regard runs contrary to the objectives outlined by 
Allen and McVadon and the National Defense White Paper but appears justifiably 
necessary to maintaining secrecy and security.  This cautious stance appears even more 
necessary when one considers Carol Atkinson’s recent work which finds American 
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“military engagement activities [inclusive of military exchanges] were positively 
associated with liberalizing trends with the most pronounced effects for authoritarian 
states.”179  In an era in which the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy is 
considered by many as fragile, and given the important role of the PLA in backing the 
CCP, the need to reduce PLA exposure to democratic institutions cannot be taken lightly. 
Despite the history of restrictions and the necessity for security, leaders in both 
nations have advocated for increased contact.  Several opportunities for increased 
transparency and open dialogue remain untapped.  In 2006 Admiral Fallon invited PLA 
General Liang to meet with the Pacific and Asian chiefs of defense, a forum in which the 
PLA has never participated.180  While this is another small step to incorporate the PRC in 
such forums, the PRC has yet to attend other high-level dialogues such as a similar forum 
hosted by PACOM, the Annual Chiefs of Defense Conference held in Hawaii each fall 
since 1999. 181   PRC participation in more senior forums and conferences to PRC 
participation will improve understanding, reduce suspicion and create an environment 
where further, more substantive exchanges can be explored.  
Other opportunities exist as well.  As Fallon stated in his press conference in 2006, 
the United States needs to continue mid- and lower-level exchanges.182  Only through 
“one-on-one discussions with counterparts in both countries”183 can our future defense 
leaders gain a better understanding of the PLA.  Chinese sources acknowledge the 
importance of such contacts.   
The greatest opportunity for military exchange remains with cadets and 
junior service members who are immune to the politics found within our 
governments.  These will be the people who determine the fate of our 
[future military] relationship.184   
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Other Chinese officials shared similar views.  After Admiral Fallon’s May 2006 visit to 
the PRC the Deputy Chief of the General Staff was reported as saying, 
The two armies will continue to enhance exchanges and cooperation in 
institutional exchanges, military academy exchanges, warship visit 
exchanges, humanitarian relief and disaster reduction, coping with non-
traditional threats, and in other areas.  These activities of exchange visits 
have promoted the development of relations between the two armies.185 
Again, it appears that the PRC remains receptive to broadening the scope of exchange 
beyond the senior-level dialogues or obligatory “show and tells,” but only two such 
lower-level exchanges have occurred since 2005.186 
Whatever the opportunity, whether it is junior contacts or senior-level conferences, 
the goals should go beyond simple ‘show and tell’ events.  Rumsfeld’s historic visit to the 
2nd Artillery Headquarters in 2005187 was considered a huge step towards transparency, 
but what can be said to have been gained from this visit?  Undoubtedly, the Secretary 
walked through a sterile tour of the facility where he saw rooms with fresh paint, took 
overview briefings on the mission of the command and read the obligatory ‘Welcome 
Secretary Rumsfeld’ signs strategically posted throughout the area.188  But aside from the 
symbolic gesture of such a visit, was there much to be gained in terms of increased 
understanding and confidence building? 
Many of the contacts over the last few decades involved simply seeing military 
equipment such as tanks, planes and ships.  With the end of the cold war, access to Soviet 
made military equipment is remarkably easy.  Is there a need to see another jet fly in the 
PRC?  Military intelligence officers can provide the envelope, maximum payload and 
range of any aircraft in the world inventory, so why then is it important to see the same 
                                                 
185 James Mulvenon, “Sino-U.S. Military Relations and the Admiral Fallon Visit,” China Leadership 
Monitor, 18 (2006): 2, citing Tian Yuan, “Cao Gangchuan Meets with Commander of US Pacific Command,” 
Jiefangjun bao, 11 May 2006. 
186 Kan, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. – China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 2007, 59–61. 
187 Weitz, Persistent Barriers to Sino-American Military Dialogue, 6. 
188 Bill Gertz, “China expected to put on the charm for Rumsfeld,” Washington Times, 14 October 2005. 
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20051013-110725-9009r.htm (accessed 31 January 2007) 
 72
plane flown by the PLA?  These types of visits (sometimes termed “showcase pieces”)189 
have limited utility and should be set aside for more constructive contacts where face-to-
face conversations become the norm. 
In addition to “showcase pieces,” other forums of limited utility have been 
included as successful military exchanges.  The inclusion of Sino-American contacts 
related to POW/MIA operations, GPS coordination and Air Traffic Control measures is 
arguably not representative of traditional military-to-military contacts.  While these types 
of exchanges are extremely important for their own designated purposes, including these 
events when measuring the frequency of military contacts between the United States and 
the PRC distorts trend data and makes claims of “gaining momentum” even less credible.  
As Figure 8 shows, military contacts related to these three areas accounted for more than 
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Figure 8.   Total Sino-American Military Contacts versus POW/MIA, GPS and ATC 
Related Contacts191 
 
                                                 
189 Department of Defense, Undersecretary Feith’s Media Roundtable on U.S.-China Defense Consultative 
Talks. 
190 Derived from Kan, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. – China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 
2007. 
191 Derived from Kan, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. – China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 
2007; Burns, USS Paul F. Foster Completes Visit to Qingdao, China; and Cole, U.S., China Complete Combined 
Search, Rescue Exercise.   
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It appears that even Congress increasingly understands the importance of broader 
levels of exchange, even within the confines of Sect. 1201 limits.  The 109th Congress 
introduced two sections in the Defense Authorization Bill that would have mandated 
NDU trips to the PRC and Taiwan as part of the course of study and require service 
academy cadets and midshipmen to study key languages like Chinese.192  Unfortunately, 
these requirements were dropped from the final bill during conference with the Senate.  It 
appears that even Congress remains narrowly focused on the 1201 prohibitions and 
reluctant to encourage broader exchange. 
3. Undue Calls for Reciprocity 
One of the key obstacles challenging the definition of good military-to-military 
relations is premised on the concept of reciprocity.  Seen throughout several public 
statements from senior defense officials and politicians in the United States government, 
193 this concept does not resonate with the PRC.  By focusing on events that are “a return 
in kind” 194  the United States creates unrealistic expectations much like those of 
“influencing” and “changing” PRC behavior.  Yet, on what data are these claims of 
limited reciprocity based?  As Figure 9 shows, the PRC appears to have been reciprocal, 
if not in substance, at least in the frequency of visits between 1993 and 2006.  Each spike 
in United States visits to the PRC was followed by a spike in visits by the PRC to the 
United States, almost without exception.  Similar trends appear in ship visits over the 
same period.   
This is not to say that substantive reciprocity is not important.  It does, however, 
recognize the differences in perspective between the United States and the PRC.  For the 
United States, reciprocity means a return of access and sharing in kind.  Since this is not a 
                                                 
192 Dumbaugh, CRS Report for Congress: China-U.S. Relations, 30. 
193 The call for reciprocity can be seen in a multitude of documents including: Fallon, Media Press 
Conference; and Department of Defense, U.S./China Share Interests. 
194 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. s.v. “Reciprocal.”  http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reciprocal 
(accessed 16 January 2007). 
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normative value found in Chinese culture, the PRC attempts to reciprocate in frequency 
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Figure 9.   Military Contacts.  United States Delegations to the PRC versus PRC 
Delegations to the United States196 
 
Calls for “a more equal exchange of information”197 have fallen on deaf ears.  
From the PRC’s perspective, full reciprocation was not possible since “some of their 
units were embarrassingly backward, the PLA had only limited funds for exchanges, and 
excessive transparency could expose Chinese military vulnerabilities to a potential 
adversary.” 198   If the United States continues to rely on reciprocal contacts many 
opportunities will slip by during the lengthy wait.  If, however, the United States defines 
its objectives more in line with Feith’s comments concerning clear communication, 
reciprocity is no longer necessary. 
                                                 
195 Charles W. Hooper, “Statement on US-China Military Exchanges Before the U.S. –China Economic 
and Security Review Commission,” Hearing on U.S.-China Relationship: Economics and Security in 
Perspective, 2 February 2007.  
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/written_testimonies/7_02_01_02wrts/07_02_1_2_hooper_charles_st
atement.pdf (accessed 5 March 2007). 
196 Derived from Kan, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. – China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, 
2007; Burns, USS Paul F. Foster Completes Visit to Qingdao, China; and Cole, U.S., China Complete Combined 
Search, Rescue Exercise. 
197 Department of Defense, U.S./China Share Interests. 
198 Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons from 
1995–1999,” The Washington Quarterly, 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005–6): 176. 
 75
4. Misguided Focus on Changing the Law 
Unfortunately, some have targeted the prohibitions and limitations found in P.L. 
106-65, Sect. 1201, as some of the major obstacles for improved relations.199  This 
misguided focus only detracts from the opportunities allowed by this legislation.  Given 
that this legislation primarily places reporting and vetting requirements on the DoD, there 
are plenty of authorized activities that have yet to be fully explored.  Functional 
exchanges in non-combat related areas such as medical services and civil affairs as well 
as increased dialogue concerning the application of professional military education and 
promotion systems as well as sharing expertise in humanitarian assistance are a few of 
those opportunities that are clearly within the limits of Sec 1201 yet to be fully explored 
by the DoD.   
These non-combat related contacts would be of little risk to United States national 
security but would offer the Chinese an opportunity to develop service support functions 
that have positive international and humanitarian applications…a stated objective of 
current military relations policy.  Similarly, by using benign contacts concerning military 
education, promotion processes and similar personnel areas the United States can help the 
PRC create a more professional force.  While there are valid arguments that voice 
concerns about increasing the professionalism of the PLA, a more professional PLA that 
could provide greater stability to the military relationship would be not only in the best 
interest of the PRC but also the United States.200 
 
 
                                                 
199 Fallon, Media Press Conference; and David Finkelstein, “Is China’s Military Modernization Program a 
Growing Threat to the United States and Asia?” (presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Debate Series, Reframing the China Policy Debate 3: The Implications of China’s Military Modernization 
Washington, D.C., 6 February 2007). 
200 Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians and 
How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed., Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas, 2006), 235–62.; Richard B. Cheney and Bill Taylor, Professional Military Education: As 
Asset for Peace and Prosperity (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997); and 
Kang Dong, Civil-Military Relations in China: Moving into the Year 2000 (Master’s Thesis, University of 
Nevada Reno, 1994).  These works describe the value of a professional military force as it relates to civ-mil 
relations, compliance and stability. 
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D. SUMMARY 
With these thoughts in mind the United States can begin to move forward in a 
new direction of military relations with the PRC.  Setting aside outdated and unrealistic 
expectations/objectives the United States can create more consistent and stable military 
relations policies and practices that clearly convey American intent, reduce suspicion and 
enhance understanding on both sides of the Pacific. 
The implications of such changes would not only improve the bilateral 
relationship between the United States and the PRC but also provide benefits to the entire 
Asia-Pacific Region.  Major regional actors such as Japan, India, and the Koreas would 
benefit from a more clearly defined relationship between the regions largest power and its 
fastest growing power.  While some nations like Japan may fear the implications of a 
closer Sino-American relationship on their own bilateral relationship with the United 
States, the benefits of greater military cooperation could significantly reduce the potential 
for an escalating security dilemma and arms race within the region.   
The United States still has the greatest opportunity to affect this regional balance 
and should move in a more direct fashion to capitalize while that opportunity remains.  If, 
however, the American’ views continue to vacillate in this relationship, the ability to 
affect change through military relations with the PRC may pass as other regional actors 
gain influence and increase suspicion of a rising China. 
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APPENDIX A. PUBLIC LAW 106–65—OCT. 5, 1999 113 STAT. 
721. SEC. 914. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE 
MILITARY AFFAIRS. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a Center for the Study 
of Chinese Military Affairs as part of the National Defense University. The Center shall 
be organized under the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the University. 
 
(b) QUALIFICATIONS OF DIRECTOR.—The Director of the Center shall be an 
individual who is a distinguished scholar of proven academic, management, and 
leadership credentials with a superior record of achievement and publication regarding 
Chinese political, strategic, and military affairs. 
 
(c) MISSION.—The mission of the Center is to study and inform policymakers in the 
Department of Defense, Congress, and throughout the Government regarding the national 
goals and strategic posture of the People’s Republic of China and the ability of that 
nation to develop, field, and deploy an effective military instrument in support of its 
national strategic objectives. The Center shall accomplish that mission by a variety of 
means intended to widely disseminate the research findings of the Center. 
 
(d) STARTUP OF CENTER.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish the Center for 
the Study of Chinese Military Affairs not later than March 1, 2000. The first Director of 
the Center shall be appointed not later than June 1, 2000. The Center should be fully 
operational not later than June 1, 2001. 
 
(e) IMPLEMENTATION REPORT.— 
(1) Not later than January 1,2001, the President of the National Defense 
University shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report setting forth the 
President’s organizational plan for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military 
Affairs, the proposed budget for the Center, and the timetable for initial and full 
operations of the Center. The President of the National Defense University shall 
prepare that report in consultation with the Director of the Center and the Director 
of the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the University. 
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit the report under paragraph (1), 
together with whatever comments the Secretary considers appropriate, to the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 
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APPENDIX B. PUBLIC LAW 106–65—OCT. 5, 1999 113 STAT. 
721. SEC. 1201. LIMITATION ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY 
EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS WITH CHINESE PEOPLE’S 
LIBERATION ARMY. 
(a) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of Defense may not authorize any military-to-military 
exchange or contact described in subsection (b) to be conducted by the armed forces with 
representatives of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China if that 
exchange or contact would create a national security risk due to an inappropriate 
exposure specified in subsection (b). 
 
(b) COVERED EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS.—Subsection (a) applies to any 
military-to-military exchange or contact that includes inappropriate exposure to any of 
the following: 
(1) Force projection operations. 
(2) Nuclear operations. 
(3) Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations. 
(4) Advanced logistical operations. 
(5) Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of 
mass destruction. 
(6) Surveillance and reconnaissance operations. 
(7) Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation 
in warfare. 
(8) Military space operations. 
(9) Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces. 
(10) Arms sales or military-related technology transfers. 
(11) Release of classified or restricted information. 
(12) Access to a Department of Defense laboratory. 
 
(c) EXCEPTIONS.—Subsection (a) does not apply to any search and rescue or 
humanitarian operation or exercise. 
 
(d) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION BY SECRETARY.—The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives, not later than December 31 each year, a 
certification in writing as to whether or not any military-to-military exchange or contact 
during that calendar year was conducted in violation of subsection (a). 
 
(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than March 31 each year beginning in 2001, the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report providing the 
Secretary’s assessment of the current state of military-to-military exchanges and contacts 
with the People’s Liberation Army. 
The report shall include the following: 
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(1) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts during the period since the 
last such report, including a summary of topics discussed and questions asked by 
the Chinese participants in those contacts. 
(2) A description of the military-to-military exchanges and contacts scheduled for 
the next 12-month period and a plan for future contacts and exchanges. 
(3) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Chinese expect to gain from 
those military-to-military exchanges and contacts. 
(4) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Department of Defense expects 
to gain from those military-to-military exchanges and contacts. 
(5) The Secretary’s assessment of how military-to-military exchanges and 
contacts with the People’s Liberation Army fit into the larger security relationship 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. 
 
(f) REPORT OF PAST MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS 
WITH THE PRC.—Not later than March 31, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives a report on past military-to-military exchanges 
and contacts between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The report 
shall be unclassified, but may contain a classified annex, and shall include the following: 
(1) A list of the general and flag grade officers of the People’s Liberation Army 
who have visited United States military installations since January 1, 1993. 
(2) The itinerary of the visits referred to in paragraph (2), including the 
installations visited, the duration of the visits, and the activities conducted during 
the visits. 
(3) The involvement, if any, of the general and flag officers referred to in 
paragraph (1) in the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989. 
(4) A list of the facilities in the People’s Republic of China that United States 
military officers have visited as a result of any military-to-military exchange or 
contact program between the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
since January 1, 1993. 
(5) A list of facilities in the People’s Republic of China that have been the subject 
of a requested visit by the Department of Defense that has been denied by 
People’s Republic of China authorities. 
(6) A list of facilities in the United States that have been the subject of a requested 
visit by the People’s Liberation Army that has been denied by the United States. 
(7) Any official documentation (such as memoranda for the record, after-action 
reports, and final itineraries) and all receipts for expenses over $1,000, concerning 
military-to-military exchanges or contacts between the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China in 1999. 
(8) A description of military-to-military exchanges or contacts between the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China scheduled for 2000. 
(9) An assessment regarding whether or not any People’s Republic of China 
military officials have been shown classified material as a result of military-to-
military exchanges or contacts between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China. 
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APPENDIX C. PUBLIC LAW 106–65—OCT. 5, 1999 113 STAT. 
721. SEC. 1202. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than March 1 each year, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the specified congressional committees a report, in both classified and 
unclassified form, on the current and future military strategy of the People’s Republic of 
China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-
technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable 
development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of 
military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years. 
 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report under this section shall include 
analyses and forecasts of the following: 
(1) The goals of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy. 
(2) Trends in Chinese strategy that would be designed to establish the People’s 
Republic of China as the leading political power in the Asia-Pacific region and as 
a political and military presence in other regions of the world. 
(3) The security situation in the Taiwan Strait. 
(4) Chinese strategy regarding Taiwan. 
(5) The size, location, and capabilities of Chinese strategic, land, sea, and air 
forces, including detailed analysis of those forces facing Taiwan. 
(6) Developments in Chinese military doctrine, focusing on (but not limited to) 
efforts to exploit a transformation in military affairs or to conduct preemptive 
strikes. 
(7) Efforts, including technology transfers and espionage, by the People’s 
Republic of China to develop, acquire, or gain access to information, 
communication, space and other advanced technologies that would enhance 
military capabilities. 
(8) An assessment of any challenges during the preceding year to the deterrent 
forces of the Republic of China on Taiwan, consistent with the commitments 
made by the United States in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8). 
 
(c) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—For purposes of this section, the 
term ‘‘specified congressional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate. 
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International 
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